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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court having stated in nearly absolute terms that
the media cannot be prohibited from publishing those things which
occur in open court,1 it seems inevitable that defendants will begin
urging and courts will begin considering new means to achieve the
same end, that is, keeping information out of the papers and off
radio and television. It further seems likely that this same end
will be sought through the means of the closed court.2
The closing of courts in criminal proceedings raises a number
1. Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court for Okla. County, 430 U.S.
308 (1977) (per curiam); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539
(1976); Barnett, The Puzzle of Prior Restraint, 29 STAN. L. REV. 539,
546 & n.50, 555-56 (1977). See also note 91 infra.
2. This is perhaps particularly likely in Nebraska in light of State v.
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of substantial constitutional issues. These issues involve the consti-
tutional rights of the media, the defendant, and the public. The
issues raised are both substantive and procedural. The substantive
rights are: the media's rights to freedom of the press,3 to public judi-
cial proceedings in criminal cases,4 and to gather information; 5 the
defendant's right to a fair trial untainted by prejudicial publicity;6
and the public's rights to an open court,7 to receive information,
and to a criminal justice system which operates as justly and expe-
ditiously as possible.
Whether one agrees that closing the court in a criminal proceed-
ing in a particular situation violates the media's substantive consti-
tutional rights, it is indisputable that consideration of closing the
court threatens those rightsY It is the threat to these substantive
rights which brings into play the procedural right involved-the
procedural due process10 right to notice and a hearing." This arti-
cle first discusses the procedural due process rights of the media
and then the substantive rights involved, focusing again on the
rights of the nonparty-the media.
II. PROCEDURAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS:
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
In spite of the conceded importance of procedural due process
in our constitutional system, it remains the least discussed aspect
of the media's rights in regard to judicial proceedings in criminal
cases-least discussed in the cases, in the literature, and, it seems,
by the attorneys. Before exploring the right and its application,
the reasons for its apparent disregard might be stated briefly. The
answer, in part, lies in Professor McKay's recognition that
Simants, 194 Neb. 783, 790, 236 N.W.2d 794, 799 (1975), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
See note 185 and accompanying text infra (quoting Simants, 194 Neb.
at 790, 236 N.W.2d at 799). Simant's attorney had requested a closed
preliminary hearing but that request was denied and a silence order
was entered instead. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 572
(Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). The silence order was
subsequently declared unconstitutional.
3. See § IV of text infra.
4. See § III-B of text infra.
5. See § III-C-1 & 3 of text infra.
6. See note 16 infra.
7. See § III-B of text infra.
8. See § III-C-2 of text infra.
9. See § III of text infra.
10. See § II of text infra.
11. See § II-B infra.
RIGHTS OF THE PRESS
[s] ometimes the best known, the most obvious principles prove
also to be the ones most readily overlooked. Thus, in concentrating
on substantive rights, such as freedom of expression, it is a common
mistake to disregard the procedural connotations .... It is easy
to forget the importance of Sir Henry Maine's reminder that liberty
is secreted "in the interstices of procedure."12
The right to procedural due process is addressed relatively infre-
quently by the attorneys, in part because the informal approach
to the trial judge can often be the best approach. Of all the ways
of handling the problem, it is the easiest, the quickest, and the least
expensive for the client. In addition, in many cases it may con-
tribute to maintaining the kind of relationship with the court which
may produce the best result for the client in the long run.
The right to procedural due process is not often addressed as
such by the courts, in part because courts considering restrictions
on the publication of criminal justice system information are often
willing, even eager, for some press participation. Otherwise there
ordinarily will be no one to present the first amendment position;
the hearing on the restrictive order will have no adversary. This
participation can range anywhere from formal intervention, to an
amicus curiae brief and argument by the press, and even to "I will
not allow you to participate in any way-but give my secretary
a copy of the brief you tried to file." Courts eager for media par-
ticipation do not feel much of a need to justify their position with
a scholarly opinion. One cannot imagine a trial court being re-
versed for allowing press participation in a hearing on a proposed
closed court order.13  The point, however, is not that the judge
should allow media participation in his own best interest, but that
the Constitution demands an adversary hearing with notice and the
opportunity to participate for the media.
A. Application of Procedural Due Process Rights
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, recognizing that "[t]he history of
American freedom is, in no small measure, the history of proce-
dure,"' 4 has referred to procedural due process as "perhaps the most
majestic concept in our whole constitutional system."' 5 In no area
12. McKay, The Preference for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1182, 1218
(1959) (quoting MAiNE, EARLY LAW AND CUSTOM 389 (1883)).
13. Regarding reversal for not allowing media participation, see note 50
and accompanying text infra. See also text accompanying note 37
infra.
14. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., sep-
arate opinion).
15. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 174 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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of the law has the United States Supreme Court more consistently
stressed the importance of procedural safeguards than in the areas
of first amendment rights and the rights of the criminally accused.
A fortiori, these safeguards apply when these two sets of rights
are both potentially involved in the so called free press-fair trial
controversy.16
The contemplated closing of the court inescapably threatens first
amendment rights,' 7 and "where first amendment rights are threat-
ened with limitation in any degree, the most exacting measure of
procedural due process will be prescribed to insure their maximum
protection."' 8 More generally, the Supreme Court has stated that
the decision as to whether the procedural due process right applies
in any given situation is a function of "'the nature of the interests
at stake,"'19 and whether they are within the fifth or the fourteenth
amendment protection of life, liberty, and property.20 Procedural
16. Much of the analysis in this area begins with the premise that the
rights of the media and the defendant are necessarily infringed and
that the answer is to find one right more important than the other
or to try to compromise the two in some sort of balance. The authors
believe that this premise is wrong and that the bulk of the analysis
of this subject never recovers from the fact that its premise is faulty.
It is a mistake to consider the rights of the press and the rights of
the defendant in the criminal case as opposed to one another. The
controversy is not one of free press v. fair trial. While the possibility
of such a conflict is not denied, see Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S.
333 (1966), that conflict is much more rare and much more easily
avoided than is suggested by characterizing the topic as free press v.
fair trial. Such a characterization jumps the analysis ahead too many
steps by incorporating a suggestion that infringement of the right to
a fair trial either is inherent or has been found to exist. In most cases,
this will not be true. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
625 n.15 (1978). See generally id. § 12-11.
17. The first amendment right to freedom of the press is applicable to
the states through the fourteenth amendment. E.g., Stromberg v. Cal-
ifornia, 283 U.S. 359 (1931); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927).
18. McKay, supra note 12, at 1219. See also id. at 1204, 1219. McKay
notes that the so called "preferred position" of first amendment rights
manifests itself in part in the "insistence upon more exacting standards
of procedural due process where freedom of speech is in any way regu-
lated." Id. at 1204.
19. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 841 (1977)
(quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972) (emphasis
in original)).
20. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 838-39 (1977);
Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976); Mullane v. Central
Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) ("[t]he cryptic and ab-
stract words of the Due Process Clause ... at a minimum ... require
that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be pre-
ceded by notice and opportunity for hearing"). Regarding fourteenth
amendment "liberty," see, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
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due process must be afforded those whose rights are so threat-
ened.21 The closed judicial proceeding in the criminal case ines-
capably threatens such liberties of the media.22 What about the
judge, for example, whose fear of exposure or personal animosity
towards the press leads him to routinely close criminal action pro-
ceedings as a means of personal defense? 23
In Carroll v. President of Princess Anne,24 county officials ob-
tained an ex parte ten day restraining order against arguably first
amendment protected activities; the National States Right Party,
a "white supremacist" organization, was restrained from holding
rallies or meetings in the county. The Supreme Court found the
ex parte nature of the hearing to be constitutionally procedurally
defective.25 The Court stated that "the failure to invite participa-
tion of the party seeking to exercise First Amendment rights ...
substantially imperils the protection which the Amendment seeks
to assure.12
6
The first amendment cases which perhaps most clearly illustrate
the notice and hearing rights of the media are those dealing with
obscenity. It is in these cases that the procedural rights of one
whose first amendment rights are threatened were given their first
thorough discussion. When the state attempts to regulate books
or movies as obscene, the first decision with which the court is faced
is not whether an infringement of the speaker's first amendment
rights can be upheld, but whether the particular speech involved
is obscene and therefore outside the protection of the first amend-
572 (1972); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954); Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
21. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977). See
also Carroll v. President of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968); Freed-
man v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,
372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963).
22. In requesting the closed judicial proceedings, the defendant no doubt
asserts his right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. The sixth amend-
ment right to an impartial jury applies to state trials through the four-
teenth amendment. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). If it
is possible for the defendant to make a prima facie case of infringe-
ment of this right-and, if at all possible, this will not be as simple
as defense counsel (and the prosecuting attorney) might suggest-he
would be entitled to a hearing. See § IV-B of text infra. The point
is that the press has a right to participate.
23. See also note 173 and text accompanying note 172 infra.
24. 393 U.S. 175 (1968).
25. "The 10-day order here must be set aside because of a basic infirmity
in the procedure by which it was obtained. It was issued ex parte,
without notice to petitioners and without any effort, however informal,
to invite or permit their participation in the proceedings." Id. at 180.
26. Id. at 184.
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ment, that is, whether the material is entitled to any first amend-
ment protection at all. These cases make it clear that procedural
due process requirements attach to the initial decision as to whether
first amendment rights are infringed or not. These cases indicate
that decisions which threaten first amendment rights-even prelim-
inary, nonfinal decisions 2 7-must provide those whose rights are
threatened with notice and an opportunity to be heard. The model
in regard to the procedural safeguards in these cases "postpones
any restraint . . . until a judicial determination . . . following no-
tice and an adversary hearing."
28
"[0] nly a judicial determination in an adversary proceeding in-
sures the necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression ....
[T]he Fourteenth Amendment requires that regulation by the
States of obscenity conform to procedures that will ensure against
the curtailment of constitutionally protected expression, which is
often separated from obscenity only by a dim and uncertain line.
It is characteristic of the freedoms of expression in general that
they are vulnerable to gravely damaging yet barely visible en-
croachments. Our insistence that regulations of obscenity scrupu-
lously embody the most rigorous procedural safeguards ... is
therefore but a special instance of the larger principle that the free-
doms of expression must be ringed about with adequate bulwarks.
• . . "[T]he line between speech unconditionally guaranteed and
speech which may legitimately be regulated . . . is finely drawn
.... The separation of legitimate from illegitimate speech calls
for ... sensitive tools. . .. "30
If strict procedural due process is constitutionally required in
deciding whether sexually 'explicit matter can be regulated, then
a fortiori procedural safeguards at least as strict are required in
the area of political speech or press-speech which involves the
workings of our criminal justice system. A plurality of the Court
recently made this same point in Young v. American Mini Thea-
tres: 31
[Elven though we recognize that the First Amendment will not
tolerate the total suppression of erotic materials that have some ar-
guably artistic value, it is manifest that society's interest in protect-
ing this type of expression is of a wholly different, and lesser,
27. See, e.g., id. at 181.
28. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 60 (1965) (referring to Kinsley
Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957)).
29. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965).
30. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963) (citations
omitted). Accord, United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U.S.
363 (1971) (procedural safeguards applicable to customs seizures);
Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971) (procedural safeguards applicable
to mail censorship).
31. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
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magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate that
inspired Voltaire's immortal comment ["I disapprove of what you
say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it"]. Whether
political oratory or philosophical discussion moves us to applaud
or to despise what is said, every school child can understand why
our duty to defend the right to speak remains the same. But few
of us would march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve
the citizen's right to see "Specified Sexual Activities" exhibited in
the theaters of our choice.3 2
Though "few of us would march our sons and daughters off to war
to preserve the citizen's right to see 'Specified Sexual Activities'
exhibited in the theaters of our choice," we do provide that right
with the strictest of procedural safeguards. Certainly the role of
the press as disseminator of information regarding our criminal jus-
tice system is entitled, at a minimum, to procedural safeguards
equivalent to those provided purveyors of pornography. 33 Cer-
tainly the threat to the first amendment is greater in the realm
of political speech than in the area of sexually explicit speech. Who
would stand for a rule which provided the former less protection
than the latter?
In deciding whether to close judicial proceedings in a criminal
case the court must decide either that doing so will not infringe
the constitutional rights of the media (or the public) or, if it will
infringe the media's rights, that such infringement can be justified
constitutionally. Resolution of these questions most clearly threat-
ens the media's right of freedom of the press3 4 and the right-par-
ticularly clear in Nebraska-of the public and the press to observe
judicial proceedings in criminal cases. 35 It also threatens the me-
dia's less sharply identified, perhaps only because less frequently
discussed, right to gather information.3 6 Any order issuing from
a procedurally defective hearing, in addition to its substantive con-
stitutional problems, would be unconstitutional as procedurally de-
fectiveS7
32. Id. at 70. The Voltaire quotation aprears id. at 63. Both quotations
appear in Part III of Mr. Justice Stevens' opinion for the Court; while
a majority joined in the judgment and in Parts I and II, only three
other Justices joined in Part III of the opinion.
33. "In the present case, [involving "'political' speech"] the reasons for
insisting upon an opportunity for hearing and notice, at least in the
absence of a showing that reasonable efforts to notify the adverse par-
ties were unsuccessful, are even more compelling than in cases in-
volving allegedly obscene books." Carroll v. President of Princess
Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 182 (1968).
34. See § III-A of text infra.
35. See § III-B of text infra.
36. See § HI-C of text infra.
37. In Northwest Publications, Inc. v. Anderson, - Minn. -, 259 N.W.2d
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There is but one exception to the rule requiring notice and a
hearing when judicial action poses such a threat to fifth or four-
teenth amendment rights, particularly when these rights involve
first amendment speech and press. The exception allows interim
relief for the shortest possible term until the participation of those
whose rights are so threatened can be secured.38  This exception
does not apply in the situation under discussion. This is not like
the case in which Nazis in full dress uniform are about to parade
through a predominately Jewish neighborhood, many of the resi-
dents of which are survivors of concentration camps. 30 Here the
media, the holder of the threatened rights, is not about to do any-
thing except in response to action by the court. The court can con-
trol the alleged evil, prejudicial publicity, until participation of the
press is secured, and it can do so without infringing, or even threat-
ening, anyone's rights. The question of closing the court only arises
when there is to be some kind of a hearing which someone alleges
should be closed. The most the court would have to do is briefly
postpone the hearing while the media is notified, their presence is
secured, and a hearing is held on the closed court question. 40
254 (1977), the Minnesota Supreme Court recently recognized that a
court order sealing court records will be unconstitutional when the
public and the press are not given prior notice and an opportunity
to be heard. The court also recognized that the burden of proof is
on those who would close the court, that a strong factual basis for
the issuance of the order must appear in the record, and that the trial
court should "consider all alternatives to the exceptional remedy of
a prior restraint and exhibit the reasons for its conclusion that each
is inadequate." Id. at -, 259 N.W.2d at 257 (footnote omitted). See
also Carroll v. President of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968).
Regarding the question of whether the press would have to obey
such an order in spite of its procedural and substantive unconstitution-
ality, see note 112 and accompanying text infra.
38. E.g., Carroll v. President of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968); Mona-
ghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARV. L. REv. 518, 532-37(1970). See also Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 n.7 (1972).
39. See National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie, 98 S.
Ct. 14 (1977) (Stevens, J., Circuit Justice) (The National Socialist
Party of America's application for a stay of an injunction against their
march was denied.); Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of
America, 46 U.S.L.W. 2396 (Ill. S. Ct. Jan. 27, 1978) (per curiam) (re-
versing the lower court injunction).
40. Judge Eric Younger recently suggested that the judge faced with this
sort of problem should always "[h]old a 'hearing' even though the
proceeding may be very informal and at an odd hour." Younger, The
Sheppard Mandate Today: A Trial Judge's Perspective, 56 NEB. L.
REV. 1, 20 (1977). See also Carroll v. President of Princess Anne, 393
U.S. 175, 180 (1968) (a hearing "however informal"). In most cases
the trial judge will not experience this sort of extreme time pressure.
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There is a second situation in which notice to the media and
an opportunity to participate in a hearing would not be required.
This is the situation in which those having requested the action
which allegedly infringes first amendment rights do not make a
prima facie case for the judicial action requested.41 In a case of
this sort, the request for a closed court can simply be denied. This,
however, is not an exception to the rule, for in this situation the
rule really never applies in the first place.
B. The Scope of the Right
Once it is determined that the procedural due process right ap-
plies, it must be decided what it means. What is necessary to sat-
isfy this constitutional demand? The minimum requirement is no-
tice to those whose rights are threatened and an opportunity for
participation in some type of hearing. The media must be notified
that the court is going to consider closing a judicial proceeding in
a criminal case and be given the opportunity to be heard.42
The Supreme Court has stated that it must be decided "'what
process is due' in the particular context,143 a decision which calls
for an analysis, and a balancing, of the governmental and private
interests which are involved.44
But, even in the emergency situation, notice and "hearing" always
should be possible.
41. See, e.g., Judge John C. Burke's denial of the City of Omaha's request
for "a temporary restraining order to prevent . . . anyone . . . 'from
making or holding any meetings, giving speeches, or making other oral
or written representations upon public property owned by the City
of Omaha.'" Omaha World-Herald, Aug. 21, 1976 at 13, col. 7 (quot-
ing from the city's petition). The city sought the order to prevent
the Ku Klux Klan from speaking on public property.
42. Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1950)
(" [A] t a minimum" due process requires "notice and opportunity for
hearing .... This right to be heard has little reality or worth un-
less one is informed that the matter is pending and can choose for
himself whether to appear or default, acquiesce or contest."); Schroe-
der v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 212 (1962) ("[T]he requirement
that parties be notified of proceedings affecting their legally pro-
tected interest is obviously a vital corollary to one of the most funda-
mental requisites of due process-the right to be heard."). See Ne-
braska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 608 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (Unless the media was "notified and ac-
corded an opportunity to be heard," they would not be bound by an
order not to publish.).
43. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 847 (1977).
See, e.g., Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976); Morrissey
v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
44. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (citations omitted).
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More precisely, our prior decisions indicate that identification of the
specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of
three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be af-
fected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous de-
privation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safe-
guards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the func-
tion involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
45
1. "the private interest that will be affected by the official
action"40
The Supreme Court has identified a number of private interests
which entitle those whose'rights are threatened to notice and an
opportunity for an adversary hearing. Among those interests have
been the broad category into which the rights most immediately
involved here are placed-first amendment rights. In analyzing the
private interests that will be affected by the governmental action
involved, it may be noted that first amendment rights are certainly
as important and as worthy of procedural due process protections
as, for example, the revocation of a driver's license 47 and the sus-
pension of a high school student.
48
So crucial, in fact, is the procedural protection of speech that
even the safeguards required by another specific constitutional
right may not always suffice when speech is involved. Thus, al-
though the Fourth Amendment provides restrictions on searches
and seizures, the First Amendment requires even more stringent
procedures when the material to be seized includes items ... that
may constitute protected speech.49
The private interests in, and the importance of, the procedural
due process right in this situation are underscored by the uniquely
45. Id. (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263-71 (1970)). More re-
cently the three requisite considerations were quoted in Smith v. Or-
ganization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 848-49 (1977), and in Dixon
v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112-13 (1977).
46. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). See note 45 and ac-
companying text supra.
47. Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (1977). In Dixon, the Court held the
due process clause applicable to the deprivation of a driver's license
by the state but, applying the three-step inquiry of Matthews v. El-
dridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976), concluded that "something less
than an evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to adverse administra-
tive action." 431 U.S. at 113.
48. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (requiring an informal hearing
before high school student may be suspended).
49. Quint, Towards First Amendment Limitations on the Introduction of
Evidence: The Problems of United States v. Rosenberg, 86 YALE L.J.
1622, 1649 (1977).
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irretrievable loss which would be incurred by the media (and the
public) through the denial of the right. The media's rights can
never be vindicated except in the abstract. The media can appeal
the decision to close a particular judicial proceeding but unless it
can move up the appellate ladder quickly enough to get an injunc-
tion against holding the closed hearing, its rights in that particular
situation will be lost forever.50 If an appellate court eventually
decides that the closing was unconstitutional, it cannot reverse and
remand for an open hearing. Obviously, neither the defendant's
conviction nor his acquittal will be reversed for violation of the
rights of the media.
It is no answer, no sufficient guarantee of the procedural due
process right or the underlying substantive rights, to suggest that
a closing order will be lifted at some future time. The right delayed
is the right denied. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court
in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart,5 1 recognized the import-
anc'e of "the element of time" to freedom of the press and that
"bringing news to the public promptly" is a "traditional function
of" the press.52 Irreparable injury sets in every moment publica-
tion is delayed.53 "Indeed, it is the hypothesis of the First Amend-
ment that injury is inflicted upon our society when we stifle the
immediacy of speech." 54 The Supreme Court has consistently noted
the inadequacy of "[d]iscussion that follows the termination of a
case."55
50. Before the rights of the press were fully recognized in Nebraska Press
Ass'n, the case, under the name State v. Simants, went from county
court to the district court, to the Nebraska Supreme Court, to Mr. Jus-
tice Blackmun as Circuit Justice, back to the Nebraska Supreme Court,
back to Mr. Justice Blackmun, back again to the Nebraska Supreme
Court and eventually to the Supreme Court of the United States. The
closing order could be reversed, as was the gag order in Nebraska
Press Ass'n, but the right to be present at the hearing cannot be re-
trieved. Review comes only after the restraint is in effect. The media
is not a party to the criminal action and, therefore, review must be
by stay application or original writ with the consequent burdens. See
also notes 77 and 334 infra.
51. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
52. Id. at 561.
53. Id. Accord, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 423 U.S. 1327, 1329
(1975) (Blackmun, J., Circuit Justice); Barnett, supra note 1, at 545.
The fair trial-free press confrontation can be contrasted, for ex-
ample, with cases involving allegedly obscene publications in which,
according to Professor Tribe, brief delay may be "tolerable because
the class of expression, both protected and unprotected, generally lacks
topical content." L. Team, supra note 16, § 12-33, at 731.
54. A. BiCKEL, THE MoRA=ITY OF CONSENT 61 (1975) (paraphrased by the
Court in Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976)).
55. Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 346 (1946) (The quotation contin-
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In the case of a closed proceeding, the restraint really could
never be lifted. At -best, the media, at some subsequent time, could
be provided with a cold record of the proceedings, which by then
are no longer news, but history.56 How many attorneys experi-
enced in courts of record have not seen a record which seemed inad-
vertantly or even intentionally altered? One of the protections pro-
vided by the free press is that against misconduct in the criminal
justice system. The closed proceeding with a transcript eliminates
that protection. In the situation in which the press is needed the
most, the very corruption to be exposed may well be in a position
to control the best, and sometimes the only, remaining evidence of
misconduct-the transcript.
The procedural due process question is not whether first amend-
ment rights are infringed but whether the contemplated action
threatens their infringement. This is not a proper situation for the
application of hindsight. If the rights are threatened the pro-
cedural due process rights apply, regardless of how the issue may
be resolved. Not to grant the media notice and the opportunity
to be heard is constitutional error. It is the next assertion of the
first amendment right which is being protected, perhaps as much
as the current one.
Clearly, then, the first part of the procedural due process test
demands notice and an opportunity to be heard for the media. Even
if one disagrees with the authors' conclusions regarding the vio-
lation of first amendment rights inherent in closing the court in
criminal cases, most would no doubt agree that the rights are ap-
plicable and that in some situations closed courts in criminal cases
would violate first amendment rights. What about the judge, for
example, who perceiving the press as out to get him routinely closes
his court, citing the defendant's right to a trial untainted by preju-
ues: "may be inadequate to emphasize the danger to public welfare
of supposedly wrongful judicial conduct."). See Shuttlesworth v. City
of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 163 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring); Car-
roll v. President of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 182 (1968) ("The pres-
ent case involves . . . 'political' speech in which the element of timeli-
ness may be important."); A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S.
205, 224 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("On the other hand, the sub-ject of sex is of constant but rarely particularly topical interest.");
Bridges v. California; 314 U.S. 252, 268-69 (1941).
56. "[A] transcript of a proceeding is a sterile substitute for observing
the actual conduct of a hearing, as reviewing courts are well aware.
Actual observation of the demeanor, voice, and gestures of the partici-
pants in a hearing must be as informative to the press and public
as those same matters are to juries during trial.' State ex rel. Dayton
Newspapers, Inc. v. Phillips, 46 Ohio St. 2d 457, 471, 351 N.E.2d 127.
136 (1976) (Stern, J., concurring).
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dicial publicity as his motive? Once it is determined that first
amendment rights can apply to the situation under discussion,
the holder of the right is entitled to notice and an opportunity to
be heard.
2. "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of addi-
tional or substitute procedural safeguards"5 '
If the procedure used provides for anything less than notice to
the media and the opportunity for them to participate in an adver-
sary hearing, then that procedure is constitutionally defective. First
amendment rights demand assurance that the court faced with the
initial decision is aware of, and has considered, both sides of the
central questions, and that it has considered both sides of the law
and of the facts. Too often the only assurance that the trial court
has considered the issues is the judicial maxim that the judge is
presumed to know all of the law.58  Whether this is, as Professor
Irving Younger has commented in another context, "another pious
fiction, that we pretend to believe, to get our work done,"5 9 it cer-
tainly provides no assurances regarding the trial judge's considera-
tion of the appropriate facts.
To experienced lawyers it is commonplace that the outcome of
a lawsuit-and hence the vindication of legal rights-depends more
often on how the factfinder appraises the facts than on a disputed
construction of a statute or interpretation of a line of precedents.
Thus the procedures by which the facts of the case are determined
assume an importance fully as great as the validity of the substan-
tive rule of law to be applied.6 0
This demand for assurances is, of course, quite consistent with
the Supreme Court's insistence, in Nebraska Press Association,6'
upon a complete record whenever this type of decision is made. A
hearing at which the media is represented and a record is made
is the best insurance against the first amendment being sacrificed,
whether in a good faith attempt to protect the defendant or in an
attempt to hide some flaw in the criminal justice system. The hear-
ing tends to insure that the judge is aware of both sides of the
57. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). See note 45 and ac-
companying text supra.
58. See Gunter, Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1,
44 (1972).
59. I. YOUNGER, THE ART OF CRoss-ExAMmAnON 12 (ABA Litigation Sec-
tion Monograph Series 1976).
60. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 520 (1958).
61. 427 U.S. 539, 562-64 (1976).
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law and the facts, and the record tends to insure that, having been
made aware of the issues, the judge considers them.
There are many risks inherent in closing judicial proceedings
in criminal cases without an adversary hearing with media partici-
pation. Judge Eric Younger has pointed out that without an adver-
sary hearing the legal system would be left with "a burden almost
unknown in our jurisprudence, the true sua sponte duty of a trial
judge."62 In this situation the trial judge will often find himself
"in the position of sole guardian of First Amendment interests even
against the express wishes of both parties. ' 63 The defense attorney
is, of course, single minded in his regard for his client's interests;
a good deal of the time this means the less publicity the better,
whether truly out of fair trial concerns or simply to save the cli-
ent's face. The prosecutor is interested in a conviction which will
stand on appeal; currently reversal of a conviction because of preju-
dicial publicity, though extremely rare, constitutes a real possibility
while reversal of a conviction for infringement of the media's rights,
of course, remains unheard of. Judge Younger notes that the emo-
tional and intellectual "burden on a trial judge who is asked to
go counter to the wishes of a defendant in a capital case on a major
constitutional point where the state joins in the defense position
is almost unbelieveable."' 4 These burdens, though perhaps less
severe, are also present in the noncapital case.
Not only is the situation unique by reason of the sua sponte
nature of the decision the judge is called upon to make, but also
by reason of the unique lack of judicial detachment and neutrality
inherent in the situation. Most other first amendment procedural
due process rights cases involve the interposition of the courts as
impartial referees to protect the rights involved. The court is
brought into the dispute as a neutral third party. In the present
situation, however, the court is uniquely involved, from the start,
62. Younger, supra note 40, at 6.
63. Id. at 6-7. Judge Younger continues: "It is a rare situation in which
a trial judge's decision on any issue enjoys the support of both parties
all the way through the United States Supreme Court argument and
is unanimously reversed. Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart was,
of course, such a case." Id. at 7 (footnote omitted).
64. Id. Judge Younger continues:
Any judge with courage is accustomed to risking reversal on
a "tough call" where he thinks he is right, but here we ask
him to run with the bulls at Pamplona with swim fins on.
He might still win, but he would have designed the contest
differently if he would have been consulted in advance.
Id. The answer is that the contest has been designed differently; the
Constitution has designed it differently; the procedural due process
right removes the swim fins.
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as a participant. It is, after all, the working of the court which
is to be reported.65 The court is not called into this dispute; rather,
it has been there, very nearly from the beginning, already a partici-
pant. The court has a stake in the proceedings which may lessen
its neutrality.
In addition to the sua sponte duty of the court and its unique
involvement as a participant in the situation being regulated, the
court is faced with the important, albeit less unique, responsibility
of making a primary judgment.66 Absent some legislation govern-
ing this situation the court is the sole interpreter of the constitu-
tional values involved. These cases typically do not involve judicial
review of legislative or executive acts. There is, for example, no
presumptively valid decision by another branch from which the
court can work. There is no "legislative history" to guide the
court.6 7
Not only does the situation present unique risks in the way in
which it leaves threatened first amendment rights unrepresented,
but cases in which prejudicial publicity causes any real problem
are extremely rare.68  This means that the trial judge will have
little or no experience in dealing with these situations. The infre-
quency with which the problem arises decreases the likelihood that
the judge will be equipped to handle its unusual burdens.
Failure to invite media participation is also destructive of the
first amendment burden of proof requirements. The burden of
proof is on those who seek to close the court. 69 What advocate
would not feel that burden lightened knowing that his side of the
issue would be the only side whose case would be presented?
65. The pressure on the judge will be to determine, rightly or wrongly,
that there will be nothing about proceedings to be held in his court-
room which will raise political issues of the sort the first amendment
was designed to insure would be publicized. Where this is not the
situation, the lack of a hearing with media participation makes it too
easy for the court to hide what it suspects (or knows) to be worthy
of publication.
66. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 164
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
67. This by no means suggests, however, that were there governing legis-
lation, such legislation would be constitutional, see note 136 infra, or
the media would have any less right to a hearing. This is simply
a further indication of how alone the court (or, perhaps more cor-
rectly, the first amendment) typically stands in these cases without
the participation of the media. Regarding "legislation" in this area,
see, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 16, § 12-11, at 627 & n.26.
68. E.g., Younger, supra note 40, at 2.
69. See § IV of text infra.
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The principal risk in not holding a hearing with media partici-
pation is that the deck is stacked against the first amendment. The
procedural safeguards of notice and an opportunity to participate
in a hearing on the closed court question "assure the fullest presen-
tation and consideration of the matter which the circumstances per-
mit . . . . The participation of both sides is necessary. . . . Cer-
tainly, the failure to invite participation of the party seeking to
exercise First Amendment rights ... substantially imperils the pro-
tection which the Amendment seeks to assure."70
The "additional procedural safeguards"-notice to the media and
an adversary hearing-promote a number of important values
(many of which have been previously discussed). They will result
in the fullest presentation and consideration of all of the important
constitutional issues involved. It certainly would be a fiction to
believe that without media participation all of the revelant legal
principles and facts will be before the court. These procedural safe-
guards make a balanced judgment more likely, a judgment less like-
ly predisposed to suppression and more likely sensitive to first
amendment values. The hearing certainly tends to guarantee that
the burden of proof will be an actual burden and that any order
issued will be as narrowly drawn as possible.
The adversary hearing forces all but the most recalcitrant of
judges to be intellectually honest and to confront exactly what they
are trying to accomplish and how best to do so. It also promotes
judicial honesty and facing up to the real issues by requiring a com-
plete record which will be available for, and will enable, appellate
review-review which in first amendment cases includes both the
law and the facts.71
Finally, "fairness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided de-
termination of facts decisive of rights. ' 72 It is important that the
opportunity for an adversary hearing be provided not only for the
sake of fairness but also for its appearance; "justice must not only
be done but must manifestly be seen to be done. '73
70. Carroll v. President of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 181, 184 (1968).
Even if it were possible for a court to decide that a closing does in-
fringe first amendment rights but that the infringement is justified,
the first amendment would demand that the court's order "be tailored
as precisely as possible to the exact needs of the case .... [F] ailure
to invite participation of the [media] reduces the possibility of a
narrowly-drawn order." Id. at 184.
71. E.g., Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927).
72. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170 (1951)(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
73. Rex v. Justices of Bodmin, [1947] 1 K.B. 321, 325 (1946) (quoted in
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3. "the government's interest, including the function involved
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional
or substitute procedural requirement would entail"74
"In striking the appropriate due process balance the final factor
to be assessed is the public interest. This includes the administra-
tive burden and other societal costs that would be associated with
requiring [an adversary hearing] as a matter of constitutional
right . . . . 75 The societal costs, monetary and otherwise, and the
administrative burden of providing the media notice and an oppor-
tunity for a hearing prior to closing judicial proceedings in criminal
cases are at most insubstantial. In the main, these procedural safe-
guards will not require that an additional hearing be held but
simply that the media be given notice and be allowed to participate
in a hearing which is being held anyway. The public interest in
efficiency would not be impeded by media participation. If in some
sort of emergency situation, an immediate hearing were to become
necessary, the greatest inefficiency possible would be a few hours
of delay so that the media could be notified and their physical pres-
ence secured.70  And in most cases even such a short delay could
be minimized, if not avoided altogether, with a little foresight, by
anticipation of potential problems and advance notification of the
media of their potential interest.77
C. Procedural Due Process: Conclusion
Given the private interests threatened-the nature of the inter-
ests at stake and the irreparable nature of the threatened loss-
the unique risk of erroneous deprivation coupled with the value
of notice and opportunity to be heard, and the nearly absolute lack
of a countervailing governmental interest in denying notice and an
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 172 n.19(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
74. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). See note 45 and ac-
companying text supra.
75. Id. at 347.
76. Of course the media must be allowed sufficient time to prepare its
position. The opportunity to participate must be a real one. How-
ever, with some foresight by media counsel regarding the law, and
with cooperation between media counsel on the one hand and the cli-
ent's reporters and counsel for the parties on the other hand regarding
the facts, this preparation time need not present any danger to defend-
ant's rights or to the criminal justice system generally.
77. In fact the real fiscal and administrative burdens will be found in
the situation in which the media is deprived of its procedural due proc-
ess rights. See note 50 supra. See also text accompanying notes 139-
42 infra.
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adversary hearing, it is inconceivable that these two basic proce-
dural due process requirements are not the constitutional right of
the media in this situation.
[A] democratic government must . . . practice fairness; and fair-
ness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided determination of
facts decisive of rights.
... The validity and moral authority of a conclusion largely
depends on the mode by which it was reached. Secrecy is not con-
genial to truth-seeking and self-righteousness gives too slender an
assurance of rightfulness. No better instrument has been devised
for arriving at truth than to give a person in jeopardy of serious
loss notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it. Nor
has any better way been found for generating the feeling, so im-
portant to a popular government, that justice has been done.78
III. SUBSTANTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
A. Closed Judicial Proceedings in Criminal Cases as Prior Restraints
On News Reporting by the Media
1. Prior Restraints on Media Reports Concerning Judicial Pro-
ceedings in Criminal Prosecution are Unconstitutional
The particular facts regarding previously attempted prior re-
straints on news reporting by the press have been many and varied.
The one thing that has remained constant is that when such at-
tempts have been subjected to constitutional scrutiny by the United
States Supreme Court, they have without exception been struck
down in the face of the first amendment. The most recent in this
line of cases is Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart.7 9
It is "generally, if not universally"8 0 conceded that "the main
purpose of [the first amendment] is 'to prevent all such previous
restraints upon publication as had been practiced by other govern-
78. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170-72
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Mr. Justice Frankfurter quotes
from 5 THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF DANIEL WEBSTER 163 (Nat'l ed.
1903): "In a government like ours, entirely popular, care should be
taken in every part of the system, not only to do right, but to satisfy
the community that right is done." 341 U.S. at 170-72. He also quotes
from Rex v. Justices of Bodmin, [1947] 1 K.B. 321, 325 (1946): "Time
and again this court has said that justice must not only be done but
must manifestly be seen to be done ... ." 341 U.S. at 170-72.
79. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
80. Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). Accord, e.g.,
New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509, 511, 514 (1969);
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 249 (1936).
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ments.' "81 "Prior restraints are 'the essence of censorship,' and
'[o]ur distaste for censorship-reflecting the natural distaste of a
free people-is deep-written in our law.' ",82
In Nebraska Press Association, Chief Justice Burger, for the
Court, stated:
IPrior] restraints on speech and publication are the most serious
and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights....
A prior restraint . . . has an immediate and irreversible sanc-
tion. If it can be said that a threat of criminal or civil sanctions
after publication "chills" speech, prior restraint "freezes" it ....
The damage can be particularly great when the prior restraint
falls upon the communication of news and commentary on current
events .... [T]he protection against prior restraint should have
particular force as applied to reporting of criminal proceedings,
whether the crime in question is a single isolated act or a pattern
of criminal conduct.8 3
The Chief Justice recognized that in the past "every member of the
Court" was in agreement "tacitly or explicitly" that "prior re-
straint [s are] presumptively unconstitutional. '8 4
A majority of the Court has gone on to state their virtual
agreement that such prior restraints are always unconstitutional,
that the ban is absolute. In Nebraska Press Association, three Jus-
tices made it quite clear that prior restraints on news reporting
by the press are simply and always impermissible. s5 Two other
Justices stated their virtual agreement with that ultimate conclu-
sion. Mr. Justice Stevens, concurring in the judgment, stated that
he "subscribe[s] to most of what Mr. Justice Brennan says and,
if ever required to face the issue squarely, may well accept his ulti-
mate conclusion.""", Citing Mr. Justice Brandeis' concurring opin-
ion in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority,8 7 Mr. Justice
Stevens indicated not disagreement but simply reluctance to go fur-
ther than immediately necessary when deciding constitutional ques-
tions. Mr. Justice White, in his concurring opinion, stated: "Tech-
nically there is no need to go farther than the court does to dispose
of this case. . . . I should add, however, that for reasons which
the Court itself canvasses there is grave doubt in my mind whether
81. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 557 (1976) (quoting Pat-
terson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (emphasis in original)).
82. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 589 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (citations omitted).
83. Id. at 559 (emphasis added).
84. Id. at 558.
85: Id. at 572-73 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
86. Id. at 617 (Stevens, J., concurring).
87. 297 U.S. 288, 346-47 (1936).
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[such] orders with respect to the press . . .would ever be justi-
fiable."""
This admittedly "extraordinary protection against prior re-
straints enjoyed by the press under our constitutional system"80 ap-
plies in part precisely because "prior restraints on speech and publi-
cation are the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on
First Amendment rights."9 This "extraordinary protection" ap-
plies with particular force to media reporting of judicial proceedings
in criminal cases.9 1
2. Closed Judicial Proceedings in Criminal Cases Constitute
Prior Restraints on the Media
Although the concept of prior restraint has played an extremely
important role in first amendment analysis, from Near v. Minne-
88. 427 U.S. at 570-71. See Prettyman, Nebraska Press Association v. Stu-
art: Have We Seen the Last of Prior Restraints on the Reporting
of Judicial Proceedings?, 20 ST. Louis U. L.J. 654 (1976); L. TRIBE,
supra note 16, § 12-11, at 627. The record in Nebraska Press Ass'n,
which was not enough to justify prior restraint, included "the premedi-
tated mass murder" in a town of about 850 of six members of one
family, ranging in ages from five to 66, evidence of sexual assault
both before and after death, a number of incriminating statements by
the accused (one of which the Court characterized as "evidently a con-
fession"), and "intense . . . pervasive" and "widespread" local, re-
gional and national news coverage. 427 U.S. at 570-71. See note 314
infra.
89. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 730-31 (1971)
(White, J., concurring).
90. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
91. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (.1976); Cox Broad-
casting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975). Although the focus
of this article is on prior restraint of press reports and comments re-
garding judicial proceedings in criminal cases, and it is in this context
that the absolute bar to prior restraints is discussed, apart from such
cases there is only one exception to the absolute ban, whatever the
circumstances. "Our cases, it is true, have indicated there is a single,
extremely narrow class of cases in which the First Amendment's ban
on prior judicial restraint may be overridden." New York Times Co.
v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring).
That single exception involves military security, such things as the
publication of sailing dates of troop transports and the number and
location of troops and the obstruction of recruiting. Id. It is note-
worthy that while the Supreme Court recognizes this single exception
it has only been adverted to in dictum and the United States Supreme
Court has never applied the exception. It is further noteworthy that
this exception was not even applied in New York Times in spite of
the fact that the Pentagon Papers were classified "Top Secret-Sensi-
tive," were obtained surreptitiously, and a majority of the Court be-
lieved that their release would be harmful to the nation and that those
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sota92 in 1931 to last term's decision in Nebraska Press Association,
there is no clear, precise definition as to what constitutes prior re-
straint.9 3 One way to approach the limits of the doctrine is to look
for common threads in the cases and in the literature to decide what
types of restraints have been found to be prior restraints, and why.
If what makes prior restraints so particularly objectionable can be
established, press rights in closed judicial proceedings can be ana-
lyzed in those terms. A number of principles basic to prior re-
straint analysis can be, and have been, delineated.
First, and perhaps most often, the .prior restraint is discussed
in terms of what it is not; it is not subsequent punishment.9 4 But,
of course, that sort of statement is not really helpful. It simply
restates the initial question. What is it about that which is com-
monly labeled prior restraint which distinguishes it from other
forms of restraint, including that which is commonly labeled subse-
quent punishment?
A number of features of the prior restraint can be identified.
The most important and most frequently discussed are the extent
of its coverage, its timing, its effectiveness, the dynamics of such
restraint, and the speculative nature of the need for such a re-
straint. Of all the alternative forms of regulation, that which is
most soundly condemned is that which does the most damage-the
prior restraint. It does the most damage in part because of the
content of its coverage. More information is swept under its pro-
hibition than would be prohibited by alternatives to the prior re-
straint. The restriction tends to be broadly stated and therefore
more repressive of the amount of information available to the pub-
lic. One author has stated: "The theory on which the prior form
of restraint is nullified appears to be . . .that the prior restraint
is viewed as excessively and unnecessarily stifling, as a more re-
strictive alternative than subsequent punishment."9' 5 When Profes-
responsible might even be prosecuted after release for violating certain
espionage statutes. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539,
591-92 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
92. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
93. Things have not changed much since Professor Emerson wrote in 1955:
"Despite an ancient and celebrated history, the doctrine of prior re-
straint remains today curiously confused and unformed." Emerson,
The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAw AND CONTEmP. PROB. 648, 649
(1955).
94. E.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 589 (1976) (Brennan,
J., concurring in the judgment); Emerson, supra note 93, passim; Note,
Prior Restraints and the Press Following the Pentagon Papers Cases-
Is the Immunity Dissolving?, 47 NoTRE DAME LAW. 927, 928 (1972).
95. Barnett, supra note 1, at 543 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
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sor Emerson discussed the nature of the prior restraint, setting out
its elements as he saw them, he described the first element as fol-
lows:
A system of prior restraint normally brings within the complex of
government machinery a far greater amount of communication
than a system of subsequent punishment. It subjects to govern-
ment scrutiny and approval all expression in the area controlled-
the innocent and borderline as well as the offensive, the routine
as well as the unusual.9 6
It is, in short, a more complete restriction on communication.
These problems are certainly inescapably associated with the
closed court. The breadth of the restraint is great-greater, for
example, than the gag order unanimously declared unconstitutional
in Nebraska Press Association. The gag order generally allows
some things to be published, while restricting others. The closed
court prevents the publication of anything which occurs therein. 97
It does so, presumably, to protect the defendant's rights to a fair
trial but it does so in spite of a number of less restrictive, but effec-
tive, alternatives. 98
Second, the prior restraint is the most damaging of the alterna-
tive means of regulation because of its timing. It "prevent [s] com-
munication from occurring at all."99 Professor Emerson discussed
the second element of the prior restraint as keeping the communi-
cation from ever reaching the market place. And, he said, if it
should reach the market place in spite of the prior restraint it is
often at a time when publication has become "obsolete or unprofit-
able." 0 0 He contrasts this with procedures which allow the com-
munication to occur and then allow action to be taken against the
speaker.' 0 ' These elements of the prior restraint are certainly pres-
ent in the closed court situation. The closed court will prevent
all or at least some of the publication from ever occurring. What-
ever does eventually become available comes at a time when its
publication is obsolete or unprofitable.'0 2 And this happens in an
area in which timing is of the essence.10 3
96. Emerson, supra note 93, at 656. See also Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stu-
art, 427 U.S. 539, 589-90 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judg-
ment) (quoting a later restatement of these same points by Professor
Emerson and referring to them as a cogent summary).
97. For an additional discussion of this same point, see notes 50, 51-55,
62-64 and accompanying text supra, and text accompanying notes 121
and 132 infra.
98. See § IV-A of text infra.
99. Emerson, supra note 93, at 648.
100. Id. at 657.
101. Id.
102. E.g., notes 49-56 and accompanying text supra.
103. E.g., notes 51-55 and accompanying text supra.
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Also characteristic of prior restraints, and perhaps their "most
significant feature,"10 4 is the fact that the dynamics of the system
drive forward excesses. Professor Emerson questions the general
ability, personality, and objectivity of the censor. Although the
trial judge is not the same sort of professional censor that so
troubled Professor Emerson, there are factors present which, in
similar ways, adversely affect the assumed ability and objectivity
of the trial judge. In every instance of the closed court the censor
is a principal subject of the censored material. The judge will be
inclined to decide that in his court nothing will occur which needs
public exposure. A unique lack of judicial detachment and neutral-
ity is inherent in the situation. In some cases both the prosecutor
and defense counsel agree on closing the court. By the time a
closed court order is appealed, there can be a reversal, but nothing
left to remand; the proceeding will be over. The only remand
comes in those extremely rare cases in which the defendant, over
the appropriate objection, has been denied a fair trial:105
The dynamics of the system are such that the decision to prevent
publication is easier than the available alternatives and, therefore,
more likely to be turned to. Once the restraint is in force, the
burdens are on those restrained, not on the government. The pro-
ceeding is closed with but a stroke of the pen and the next step
is left to the media.10 6 The stroke of a pen substitutes for the often
long and hard decision to undertake subsequent punishment. More
immediately, the stroke of the pen substitutes for a more extensive
voir dire, a change of venire or venue, a continuance, sequestration
of jurors, more complicated instructions, and all of the other alter-
natives. 0 7 This would be very aittactive to the judge who knows
either that nothing untoward will happen in his court or that it
will. There is a built-in drive toward censorship.
The prior restraint is also characterized by its procedures. "It
is evident that one of the most important characteristics of a prior
restraint is that the decision to restrain publication often rests with
a single government official"' 0 8 rather than a jury. The publisher
104. Emerson, supra note 93, at 658.
105. See note 65 and accompanying text supra. See also Barnett, supra
note 1, at 542 (" [J] udges may be led to close hearings as a prophylac-
tic measure against the possibility that prejudicial information will
be revealed.").
106. Emerson, supra note 93, at 657.
107. See § IV-A of text infra.
108. Note, supra note 94, at 931. Accord, Emerson, supra note 93, at 657.
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does not get the advantages of the procedural protections built
around the criminal prosecution or even the civil action. 10 9
A recent decision by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit is illustrative. Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer 10 in-
volved a challenge to a local rule of court proscribing extrajudicial
comments by attorneys. The seventh circuit said that this did not
constitute a prior restraint. In doing so, it identified three elements
of a prior restraint. The first was punishment by contempt. The
fact that violation of the prior restraint is punishable by contempt
is in large part the reason that the criminal procedural safeguards
do not apply. The second and third elements were identified as
"a predetermined judicial prohibition restraining specified 'ex-
pression . . . [which] cannot be violated even though the judicial
action is unconstitutional if opportunities for appeal existed and
were ignored."1 1  The "predetermined judicial prohibition" of the
closing order restrains the publication of those things which occur
at the closed proceeding. Regarding the violation of the prohibi-
tion, the seventh circuit distinguished between court rules and judi-
cial orders. In Chicago Council of Lawyers the restraint was im-
posed by rule of court. A rule of court can be violated and then
challenged as unconstitutional even though opportunities for appeal
exist; a court order cannot." 2 It is this feature, said the seventh
circuit, which distinguished that prohibition from a prior restraint.
In the closed court situation, the restraint is imposed by judicial
orders, not court rules. In any event, in most closed court cases
assertion of the first amendment right by violating the closing order
109. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976); Chicago
Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 248 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied sub noma. Cunningham v. Chicago Council of Lawyers, 427 U.S.
912 (1976); A. BICKEL, supra note 54; L. TRIBE, supra note 16, § 12-32,
at 726; Emerson, supra note 93, at 657; Note, supra note 94, at 931.
110. 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom. Cunningham v.
Chicago Council of Lawyers, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
111. Id. at 248.
112. Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967) (unconstitutional court
order must be obeyed pending appeal); Chicago Council of Lawyers
v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 248 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub noma.
Cunningham v. Chicago Council of Lawyers, 427 U.S. 912 (1976);
United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496, 500, 509-14 (5th Cir. 1972),
on remand, 476 F.2d 373 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976(1973); L. TRIBE, supra note 16, § 12-32, at 726-28; Goodale, The Press
Ungagged: The Practical Effect on Gag Order Litigation of Nebraska
Press Association v. Stuart, 29 STa-N. L. REv. 497, 504-13 (1977); Note,
Gag Orders On the Press: A Due Process Defense to Contempt Cita-
tions, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 187 (1977). But see Barnett, supra
note 1, at 555,
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and asserting its unconstitutionality as a defense to a subsequent
prosecution will not be possible. This method of protecting the
rights of the media-a nethod which, according to the seventh cir-
cuit, provides sufficient protection to take the situation out of the
category of prior restraint-will not provide any significant protec-
tion in the closed court cases. However, if one did violate such
an order (through eavesdropping, getting information from par-
ticipants, or however), one would not only be subject to contempt,
but also would most certainly be punished "because the judge
whose order has been disobeyed can be expected to pursue the mat-
ter.""
3
There is one final particularly abhorrent feature common to
prior restraints, that is, the speculative nature of the damage that
will be done should the publication be allowed. What damage will
be done, if any, cannot be known until after the publication has
occurred.114 Such speculation permeates the use of the closed court
to prevent an unfair trial by reason of prejudicial publicity.115
It is these things which make the prior restraint anathema under
the first amendment. The closed court in the criminal action suf-
113. Barnett, supra note 1, at 552. Accord, A. BicKEr,, supra note 54, at
61.
114. See, e.g., L. TmBE, supra note 16, § 12-12, at 631, § 12-33, at 730; note
328 and accompanying text infra. See also New York Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (speculative effect of publication
of the Pentagon Papers). The prepublication order, in these circum-
stances, can never be sufficiently narrow.
115. See, e.g., notes 321-34 infra.
The speculative nature of the damage partially accounts for the
distinction between the closed proceeding which is justifiable and the
closed proceeding which is an unconstitutional prior restraint. For
example, the publication (distribution) of obscene materials and false
advertising can be prevented.
[RIelative certainty can ordinarily be obtained in the context
of prepublication restraints on the publication of obscene ma-
terial or commercial advertisements. The existence of ob-
scenity and the falsity of an advertiser's factual representa-
tions need not depend on contextual elements which take
shape only after the material's dissemination .... A court's
determination that material is obscene or an advertisement
is false is ... as plausible before as after the communication's
publication.
L. TRIBE, supra note 16, § 12-33, at 730. The same might be said in
regard to the in camera proceeding in a civil action regarding a trade
secret, see note 334 infra, or in a criminal prosecution in which an
undercover agent's identity needed protection or a witness refused to
testify except in camera for fear of reprisals. See generally L. TRIBE,
supra note 16, § 12-11, at 629 n.28 (citing cases). The damage would
be the certain loss of the testimony. In addition, the court is not just
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fers from these same problems and should be just as anathematic. 116
In any event, and perhaps most inescapably, the logic of the Su-
preme Court's recognition that "the character of every act depends
upon the circumstances in which it is done" 1 7 applies with full
force to the question at hand. When the act of closing the court
is considered in the circumstances in which it is cohtemplated, the
conclusion is inescapable that such a closing would constitute a
prior restraint on the press. The principal reason that such an
order is considered is to prevent, what might occur in court from
being reported by the press. A major, if in truth not the only,
reason that such an order is considered is to restrain the press, to
remove its opportunity to publish, and to effect that same prior
restraint that was held unconstitutional in Nebraska Press Associa-
tion.118
The order closing the court must be considered "in light of its
history and of its present setting."" 9 The history of the closed
court and its present setting both indicate that it is a substitute
for restraints directed solely at the press-restraints recently and
unequivocally declared unconstitutional. Generally a court's real
concerned with media reports of the identity of the witness. There
could be a demonstrable need not relating to the press at all, i.e., keep-
ing a member of the reprisal organization from personally observing.
And, while in regard to the fair trial question damage to the sixth
amendment right is necessarily speculative, there are other situations
in which damage to other constitutional rights may not be speculative.
For example, attendance at a judicial conference, an executive session
of a legislative body, or a meeting of the President's Cabinet could
create a certain interference with a known constitutional right, i.e.,judicial, legislative or executive privilege, and constitutional separa-
tion of powers. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705-
06, 708 (1974) (regarding the existence of a constitutional executive
privilege); note 320 infra.
116. Certainly, whether it is labeled a "prior restraint" or not, closing the
court in a criminal action should be as difficult to accomplish as a
"prior restraint." The procedural safeguards, § II of text supra,
should be provided and the burden of proof should be as tough and
should be allocated to those who would close the proceeding, § IV
of text infra. The Minnesota Supreme Court has recently recognized
a district court order sealing court records as a prior restraint. North-
west Publications, Inc. v. Anderson, - Minn. -, 259 N.W.2d 254
(1977).
117. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51 (1919) (Holmes, J.).
118. In any event, leaving aside any question of intent, this becomes one
of those "varied forms of governmental action" which unintentionally
but "inevitably" lead to the abridgment of the "indispensable liberties
... of speech [and] press." NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,
357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958). See also Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.
105 (1943); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
119. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936).
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concern is not with attendance by members of the public at large
and word of mouth reports of the proceedings, but with keeping
these reports out of the papers and magazines and off television
and radio. The court is concerned with the media. The fact that
this constitutes a somewhat novel form of censorship does not in-
sulate it from attack.120  "If courts begin closing hearings in order
to prevent potentially prejudicial publicity, the Supreme Court will
be faced with prior restraints in a form different from, but just
as effective as, the one struck down in Nebraska Press Ass'n." 121
120. E.g., Oliver v. Postel, 30 N.Y.2d 171, 182, 282 N.E.2d 306, 311, 331 N.Y.S.
2d 407, 414 (1972). Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 249
(1936), makes the point that protection of first amendment rights is
not limited "to any particular way of abridging [them]."
121. Prettyman, supra note 88, at 661. Accord, e.g., Gaare, 'Gag' Issue Falls
on Deaf Lawyer Ears, 64 A.B.A. J. 176, 176 (1978) ("[Cllosing court-
rooms . . . is really just another form of prior restraint on publica-
tion."); State ex rel. Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. Phillips, 46 Ohio St.
2d 457, 351 N.E.2d 127 (1976).
This case deals with the right of a newspaper to observe
and publish a report of what happens at a judicial proceeding
in a criminal case [in this case a suppression hearing].
A court order which denies that right has the force of law.
There can be no dispute about the fact that such an order
abridges the freedom of the press. Such abridgment is pro-
hibited by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States ....
Id. at 460, 351 N.E.2d at 130.
The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, recently recog-
nized the closed court as an unconstitutional substitute for the gag
order. In Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 55 App. Div. 2d 107, 110-11,
389 N.Y.S.2d 719, 722 (1976), modified, No. 549 (Ct. App. Dec. 19,
1977), the court held that the closing of a pretrial suppression hearing
constituted a violation of the right of the press to publish free from
unlawful governmental interference, in part because it was merely
a substitute for a gag order. The New York Court of Appeals noted
that the appeal had become moot, Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, No.
549, slip op. at 4 (N.Y. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 1977), but then proceeded
to the merits to uphold the closure of the suppression hearing. The
decision seems clearly in error because it requires the trial court to
determine whether the public interest in an open court is a "genuine"
or "legitimate" public interest as opposed to "mere" or "active" curi-
osity. Id. at 9-10. This standard is certainly too vague, providing
insufficient protection to first amendment rights. See, e.g., Nebraska
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S.
367 (1947); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); notes 137-44
and accompanying text infra. The decision, further, seems to place
not only the burden to act but also the burden of proof on the media
to demonstrate that the public's concern measures up to this vague
standard. This placement of the burden of proof is clearly in error.
See note 196 and accompanying text infra. See also § IV of text
infra. All of this occurred in a case in which the trial court had
entered its closing order without notice to or an opportunity for a
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If one argues that closing the court in a criminal action is not
always a prior restraint on the media, but admits that it can be
such a restraint, one must then face the question of how to make
a principled judgment as to which closings fall into which category.
Although ultimately impossible to apply, one possible alternative
to prior restraint analysis would involve an ends test, that is, to
what end is the court imposing the closing order-out of genuine
concern for the rights of the defendant or simply to silence the
press?122 This test would recognize that merely silencing the press
is not a constitutional end, but would attempt to use it as a legiti-
mate means. It is legitimate to silence the press when the court's
motives are pure; when the court is doing so to protect a defendant
and not to hide its own wrongdoing.
This test requires either a facial assessment of ends or an inquiry
into motive. The facial assessment of ends is doomed. One can
assume that as trial courts become more sophisticated in these types
of cases, as they gain more experience with them, they will avoid
making records that either state or clearly demonstrate that the
end of their action is media restraint. The case in which openness
is most needed, the case of judicial wrongdoing, is the case in which
the true end will be most actively and intentionally hidden. The
court, in this situation, could always find and state another end.
The inquiry into motives is equally unacceptable, 1 23 if not im-
possible. In searching for a motive to restrain the press versus a
motive to secure defendant's rights, one might first ask whether
the reviewing court or even the trial court can ever separate the
two. Is it any more legitimate for one court to psychoanalyze an-
other than for a court to psychoanalyze a legislature? Motive, then,
can be extremely difficult to ascertain. Improper motive may be
hearing by the media and had used as its applicable constitutional
burden "a reasonable probability of prejudice." The lack of notice
and opportunity to participate in an adversary hearing is constitution-
ally infirm, see § II of text supra, and the- test of "reasonable prob-
ability" is too weak a burden, insufficiently protective of fundamental
rights even if properly placed.
122. See Oliver v. Postel, 30 N.Y.2d 171, 282 N.E.2d 306, 331 N.Y.S.2d 407
(1972) (a judge who simply wanted to silence the press and whose
desire to do so came through unmistakably in the record).
123. E.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); Brest, Palmer v.
Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Motive,
1971 Sup. CT. REv. 95; Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation
in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970). But see, e.g., Wash-
ington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244 n.11 (1976). See also Trimble v.
Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 783 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); L. TRIBE,
supra note 16, § 12-6, at 594-98.
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hidden as well as improper end.124 There is, additionally, a certain
futility in invalidating governmental action, judicial or otherwise,
on a ground which permits it to be restaged, in the same case or
the next, stressing the correct factors the second time, in a form
which will withstand constitutional challenge. In any event, is it
not true, as Chief Justice Chase said as long ago as Ex parte Mc-
Cardle,1 25 that the proper question is not one of motives but of
power.126
A second suggestion might be a test which attempts to distin-
guish the direct prior restraint from the indirect. Unless it is re-
stated as a direct versus indirect effect test, it will run full circle.
[T] he term abridgment [of freedom of speech or press] is capable
of a broad construction or of narrow construction. It may refer
only to direct abridgment in the sense that it refers to legislation
[or judicial orders] directed against speech or press . .. as such
and, therefore, does not include indirect abridgments where Con-
gress [or the courts] are concerned with appropriate public inter-
ests, and application of the legislation [or court order] does have
an indirect effect on the exercise of these freedoms .... 127
If direct versus indirect abridgments are used in the sense of the
124. It is no doubt also. true that it will be much easier for a single judge
to hide motive than for an entire legislative body to do so.
125. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868).
126. In most cases it will not be as easy as it was in Oliver v. Postel,
30 N.Y.2d 171, 282 N.E.2d 306, 331 N.Y.S.2d 407 (1972), to find an
improper motive behind an order closing the court. It is clear from
the record in Oliver that the trial judge closed a criminal trial in
response to certain newspaper articles concerning defendant's previous
record and underworld connections. The judge, expressing a concern
that these articles would have a prejudicial effect on defendant's right
to a fair trial, asked the reporters to refrain from further publication
of such articles and threatened them with contempt. When they con-
tinued to publish, he closed the court.
The appellate court in reversing the closing order made the point
that questioning the jurors revealed not one had read the articles in
question. Further,
the articles complained of ... in no way related to any events
which had transpired in the courtroom[;] their publication
obviously would not, indeed could not, have been prevented.by
refusing to allow the press to attend the trial. In other words,
even if the reporting in this case was improper and tended
to prejudice the defendant, it is manifest that closing the trial
was not the means to be employed to cure the prejudice or
prevent a continuation of the impropriety.
Id. at 181, 282 N.E.2d at 311, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 414. To some extent
Des Moines Register & Tribune Co. v. Osmundson, 248 N.W.2d 493,
500 (Iowa 1976), is, in this regard, similar to Oliver.
127. P. KAUPER, CIVL LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 116 (1962), partially
reprinted in W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR, & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 783 (4th ed. 1975).
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preceeding quotation, the test is really an ends test. The name is
different, but the problems remain the same.
What about the direct-indirect effect test? The "direct" prior re-
straint would be defined as one preventing the press from publish-
ing what it knows and the indirect prior restraint as one backing
away one step and attempting to keep the press from discovering
information in the first place. In the case of the direct prior re-
straint the court's order works directly against media publication.
In the case of the indirect restraint the order works against the
media's sources. The direct prior restraint interferes directly with
publication. The indirect prior restraint, the argument goes, inter-
feres directly with gathering and indirectly with the publishing.
While the effect in the one case is arguably less direct than in the
other, the judicial body issuing the order hopes and intends that
the effect on what is published will be at least as great. 128
An "indirect" prior restraint would be an order closing the court.
This order, however, does operate directly against the press; it di-
rectly restrains the press (and the public at large) from attending
the proceeding. Its intended effect, at best, is to keep certain in-
formation from being reported in hope of protecting the right of
an accused to a fair trial. Its intended effect, at worst, is to keep cer-
tain information from being reported out of spite or to hide incom-
petence or malfeasance. The order directly restrains the obtain-
ment of the information to be published;129 it directly restrains the
media from attending the proceeding and without intermediate
instrumentality it restrains publication. 30  A direct-indirect effect
test would exalt form over substance, a technique usually employed
as a means of avoiding resolution of difficult underlying questions.
Ultimately the only thing indirect about this restraint is the in-
tent of the censoring judge, which brings the issue full circle to
the problems of psychoanalysis and motivation discussed in connec-
tion with the ends test.13 ' Press scrutiny is most needed in the
one class of cases in which, under a test such as an ends test or
direct-indirect effect test, press scrutiny is least likely to be avail-
128. In fact the effect of the closed court will be more restrictive than
the tailored gag order. See text accompanying notes 95-98 supra; text
accompanying note 132 infra.
129. See § III-C of text infra (discussion of the media's right to gather
information).
130. The restraint is only "indirect" in the sense that it does not restrain
the press from publishing something they already know, but neither
did the prior restraint in, e.g., Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283
U.S. 697 (1931).
131. See notes 122-26 and accompanying text supra.
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able-the case of the judge who is cleverly dishonest about his mo-
tives.
Two additional problems with an ends test or a direct-indirect
prior restraint test must be noted. First, any such test would have
difficulty containing the judge who, with the purest of motives, goes
along with a prosecutor urging closing and stating a concern for
a conviction which will be upheld on appeal but who is really con-
cerned with hiding some wrongdoing of his own. The psycho-
analysis problem has now been compounded; both the motivation
of the court and the prosecutor must be judged, and the variables
continue at least through the defense attorney.
Second, an analysis which rules out the gag order and falls back
on closing the court results in a system which decreases the amount
of information available to the public. The gag order will have
been unanimously struck down and replaced with an alternative
which is more restrictive of available information. The effect of
the closed court on what is published can be expected to be greater
than the effect of any tailored gag order. Yet our judicial system
would be adopting this alternative in spite of the number of less re-
strictive alternatives.132
Even a system of press freedom through constitutionally man-
dated neutrality, a system which allows no strictures on the press
unless those strictures are general in nature,3 3 must be able to
strike down facially neutral regulation which is, in fact, directed
at the media. 13 4 The theory of enforcing press freedom through
neutrality cannot exalt form over substance. 3 5
Two choices remain, an ad hoc balancing (by whatever name)
or a recognition of the closed court as an infringment of first
amendment rights, and a prior infringement at that. 36 The ad hoc
balancing is not sufficiently protective of press freedoms, especially
in the situation in which the censor is one of the subjects of the
132. Section IV-A of text infra.
133. Bezanson, The New Free Press Guarantee, 63 VA. L. REv. 731 (1977).
See also Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-
13 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
134. Bezanson, supra note 133, at 761-62.
135. Id. at 738; Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 708 (1931)
(citations omitted). See also Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 200
(1966) ("When First Amendment rights are involved, we look even
more closely lest, under the guise of regulating conduct that is reach-
able by the police power, freedom of speech or of the press suffer.").
136. Neither the constitutionality nor the effectiveness of a categorical bal-'
ancing is within the scope of this article. It would seem very difficult
to draw up a categorical balance sufficiently precise to withstand first
amendment attack. See also note 6.7 supra.
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censored materials. Such a test would tend seriously to inhibit re-
porting and commentary about the criminal justice system,137 put-
ting all citizens in serious jeopardy. The relevant analogies run
all the way from a President deciding what evidence is relevant
to accusations that he has engaged in criminal and impeachable of-
fenses to the cat guarding the canary.
138
One problem with an ad hoc balancing test, its uncertainty, is
vividly illustrated by the judicial chronology in Nebraska Press As-
sociation. The crime which precipitated the case occurred on Octo-
ber 18, 1975. On October 22, 1975, the county court issued an order
barring public discussion with certain limited exceptions, of the
evidence to be offered at the preliminary hearing held later that
same day. Five days later the district court terminated the county
court's order and entered a new one of its own. On November 20,
1975, Mr. Justice Blackmun, as Circuit Justice, partially stayed the
district court's order, partially modified it, and left part of it in
137. E.g., Barnett, supra note 1, at 558-60. The inhibitive effect of such
a test is illustrated in a letter written by H. Brandt Ayers, the editor
and publisher of The Anniston (Ala.) Star (circulation 28,000) to
counsel for twenty-five newspaper publishers and a broadcasting com-
pany as amici curiae in Nebraska Press Ass'n:
"Small town dailies would be the unknown, unseen and
friendless victims if the Supreme Court upholds the order of
Judge Stuart. If the already irresistible powers of the judici-
ary are swollen by absorbing an additional function, that of
government censor, the chilling effect upon vigorous public
debate would be deepest in the thousands of small towns
where independent, locally owned, daily and weekly newspa-
pers are published.
"Our papers are not read in the White House, the Con-
gress, the Supreme Court or by network news executives. The
causes for which we contend and the problems we face are
invisible to the world of power and intellect. We have no
in-house legal staff. We retain no great, national law firms.
We do not have spacious profits with which to defend our-
selves and our principles, all the way to the Supreme Court,
each and every time we feel them to be under attack.
"Our only alternative is obedient silence. You hear us
when we speak now. Who will notice if we are silenced?
The small town press will be the unknown soldier of a war
between the First and Sixth Amendments, a war that should
never have been declared, and can still be avoided.
"Only by associating ourselves in this brief with our
stronger brothers are we able to raise our voices on this issue
at all, but I am confident that the Court will listen to us
because we represent the most defenseless among the peti-
tioners."
Brief for the Washington Post Co., amici curiae, at 31-32, Nebraska
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (quoting letter from H.
Brandt Ayers to counsel for Washington Post).
138. See also text accompanying note 172 infra; note 173 infra.
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force.139 On December 1, 1975, the Nebraska Supreme Court
entered a fourth different order. 14 0 And finally, on June 30, 1976,
the Supreme Court of the United States unanimously declared all
of these orders unconstitutional. 14  The matter was presented to
four different courts and to Mr. Justice Blackmun as Circuit
Justice and five different orders wefe entered. Each time a dif-
ferent court considered the order, it reached a different conclu-
sion.142
The solution is that the closed court must be recognized as a
prior restraint on the first amendment free press right. Neither
the gag order nor the closed court is an acceptable (or necessary)
way of enforcing the right to a fair trial. Free press is the norm
and has a preferred position against restrictions. The infringement
of this right in this situation is clear 1 43 and the burden is on those
who would close the court to justify such a restriction.14 4
B. The Rights of the Public and the Press to Observe Judicial
Proceedings in Criminal Cases: The Public Right to a Public Trial
1. The Right
The right to a public trial in a criminal prosecution is a right
enjoyed by both the accused 45 and the public. 46 The public's right
to be present at judicial proceedings in criminal cases is "as basic
139. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 423 U.S. 1319 (1975) (Blackmun, J.,
Circuit Justice).
140. State v. Simants, 194 Neb. 783, 236 N.W.2d 794 (1975), rev'd sub nom.
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
141. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
142. As Professor Emerson has noted: "The principal difficulty with the
ad hoc balancing test is that it frames the issues in such a broad
and undefined way, is in effect so unstructured, that it can hardly
be described as a rule of law at all." T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GEN-
ERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 54 (1966).
An ad hoc balance, or some variation thereof, becomes an even
more indefinite test in cases involving first amendment rights because,
in such cases, appellate courts make an independent review of the
facts which go into the balance. E.g., Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380,
385-86 (1927).
143. Infringement of the fair trial right, on the other hand, is not clear.
See, e.g., § IV-B of text infra.
144. See § IV of text infra.
145. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
146. E.g., Lewis v. Peyton, 352 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1965); United States v.
General Motors Corp., 352 F. Supp. 1071 (E.D. Mich. 1973); United
States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); United States ex
rel. Mayberry v. Yeager, 321 F. Supp. 199 (D.N.J. 1971); United States
v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 274 F. Supp. 790
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as that of a defendant." 147 "In our opinion," the Kentucky Supreme
Court has stated, "the question of the right of the public to attend
court proceedings and the right of the press to be there as a part
of the public is so well settled and well established that it requires
no further amplification at our hands."14 8
In fact, the common law guarantee of public trials seems to have
been developed for the benefit and protection of the public rather
than the defendant.1 49 The English legal system began requiring
public trials at a time when that system had very little regard for
the rights of the accused. 150 They were, however, concerned about
corruption among the judiciary.
In his Rationale of Judicial Evidence, published in 1897, Jeremy
Bentham approached the subject of the right to a public trial by
contrasting the Roman and English procedures:
In the Roman procedure, as exemplified on the continent, the
whole business of examination is performed in secreto judicis: in
a place, which, whether actually the private closet of the judge or
not, is at any rate equally inaccessible to the public at large.
Screened by this means almost entirely from the force of the moral
sanction, from the tutelary inspection of the public eye; improbity,
and (what is still more common) indolence and indifference, may
accomplish their ends with comparatively little risk. The court
above . . . , were they to discover any marks of improbity appar-
ent to their eyes, would naturally prevent it from taking effect. But
under the system of privacy, it is only from the information given
them by the inferior judges themselves, that the superior judges
(W.D. Pa. 1967); CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERvIcE, THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERIcA-ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S.
Doc. No. 92-82, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., amend. VI 1200 (1973) ("It appears
that while it is possible to exclude some persons from the courtroom,
it is not permissible to bar wholly the public and the press either with
or without the concurrence of the defendant."). See also United States
v. Clark, 475 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1973); United States ex rel. Bennett v.
Rundle, 419 F.2d 599 (3d Cir. 1969); Fite v. Retail Credit Co., 386
F. Supp. 1045 (D. Mont. 1975).
147. E.W. Scripps Co. v. Fulton, 100 Ohio App. 157, 161, 125 N.E.2d 896,
899 (1955). Accord, e.g., Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Winsor, 111
Ariz. 475, 533 P.2d 72 (1975); Oxnard Publishing Co. v. Superior -Court,
68 Cal. Rptr. 83 (Ct. App. 1968).
148. Johnson v. Simpson, 433 S.W.2d 644, 646 (Ky. 1968).
149. 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1834, at 435-42 (rev. ed. J. Chadbourn 1976);
31 N.Y.U. L. REv. 611 (1956).
150. 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 149, § 1834, at 436 n.1. E.g., "Sir Thomas
Smith, writing on the laws of England in 1565, spoke about the right
to a public trial." Quick, A Public Criminal Trial, 60 DICK. L. REv.
21, 22 (1955).
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obtain what information they acquire concerning what is done by
those inferior judges. In case of mere indolence, impropriety of
conduct may rise to such a degree as to be continually giving birth
to wrong decision, and frustrating the purposes of justice, without
betraying itself by any such indications as would necessarily find
their way to the eye of the court above. And in case of improbity,
or prepossession; if the seducing motive or prejudice were either
inbibed by the inferior judges from the superior, or shared with
them in any other way; a check which at best (as we have seen)
is but inadequate, would by that means be reduced to nothing.
Happily for England, the one of the two rival principles to
which good fortune rather than wisdom had given the ascendant,
was the principle of publicity. At first the small body of men who
in each district, under the name of freeholders, lorded it over a
larger body of slaves and other humble dependants,-then by de-
grees a sort of select committee of that body,--gained or pre-
served, together with the right of access and the duty of attendance,
a sort of influence which (by the favour of fortune) operated as
a check upon the king's completely dependant creatures, who in
this department of government operated as instruments of his will
under the name of judges.151
A century later Mr. Justice Brandeis summed it up in a sen-
tence: "Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants." 15 2 And
a century and a half later Mr. Justice Brennan, concurring in
Nebraska Press Association, expressed the same point:
Commentary and reporting on the criminal justice system is at the
core of First Amendment values, for the operation and integrity of
that system is of crucial import to citizens concerned with the ad-
ministration of Government. Secrecy of judicial action can only
breed ignorance and distrust of courts and suspicion concerning the
competence and impartiality of judges; free and robust reporting,
criticism, and debate can contribute to public understanding of the
rule of law and to comprehension of the functioning of the entire
criminal justice system, as well as improve the quality of that sys-
tem by subjecting it to the cleansing effects of exposure and public
accountability.153
The public's right to public judicial proceedings in criminal
cases, and the corresponding lack of a right of the defendant to
a private trial, serves a number of basic and important purposes.
The United States Supreme Court has often stressed the funda-
mental importance of free exchange of information in a demo-
cracy; such a free exchange is an essential ingredient of self govern-
ment.154 More specifically, "[o]ne of the demands of a democratic
151. 1 J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 583-84 (1827).
152. L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 62 (1933) (quoted in Nebraska
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 587 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring
in the judgment)).
153. 427 U.S. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
154. E.g., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964); Stromberg v.
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society is that the public should know what goes on in courts by
being told by the press what happens there, to the end that the pub-
lic may judge whether our system of criminal justice is fair and
right."' 5"  It is to that end that "[w]hat transpires in the court
room is public property."' 56
The traditional Anglo-American distrust for secret trials has
been variously ascribed to the notorious use of this practice by the
Spanish Inquisition, to the excesses of the English Court of Star
Chamber, and to the French monarchy's abuse of the lettre de
cachet. All of these institutions obviously symbolized a menace to
liberty. In the hands of despotic groups each of them had become
an instrument for the suppression of political and religious heresies
in ruthless disregard of the right of an accused to a fair trial.
Whatever other benefits the guarantee to an accused that his trial
be conducted in public may confer upon our society, the guarantee
has always been recognized as a safeguard against any attempt to
employ our courts as instruments of persecution. The knowledge
that every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in
the forum of public opinion is an effective restraint on possible
abuse of judicial power.157
The public proceeding restrains abuse of judicial power today
just as it has for the last 200 years.158 The judicial despot, while
not having at his command the resources of the executive or legis-
lative branches, has a tenure, an isolation from political pressures,
which makes him perhaps more dangerous in the long run. Ex-
posure is the only control over the corrupt and the petty, the tyr-
annous and the weak, the unjust, the incompetent, and the in-
capacitated.
Public trials prevent favored treatment for a favored defendant
or class of defendants. "The right to a public trial is not only to
protect the accused but to protect as much the public's right to
know what goes on when men's lives and liberty are at stake, for
a secret trial can result in favor to as well as unjust prosecution
of a defendant."' 9 The public trial protects the public's right to
know about its government'60 and promotes public confidence in
California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
155. Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 920 (1950) (Frank-
furter, J., opinion respecting denial of certiorari).
156. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947).
157. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 268-70 (1948) (footnotes omitted).
158. See, e.g., notes 56 and 67 and accompanying text supra; notes 173-
75 and accompanying text infra.
159. Lewis v. Peyton, 352 F.2d 791, 792 (4th Cir. 1965). Accord, e.g., United
States v. General Motors Corp., 352 F. Supp. 1071 (E.D. Mich. 1973);
State ex rel. Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. Phillips, 46 Ohio St. 2d 457,
467, 351 N.E.2d 127, 133-34 (1976) ; Quick, supra note 150, at 31-32.
160. See generally § III-C-2 of text infra.
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judicial remedies.161 "Secrecy . .. can only breed ignorance and
distrust of courts .... -162 Additionally, this public right restrains
"against possible perjury by witnesses who know that their testi-
mony is exposed to public knowledge."'0 3 Further, "[p]ublic trials
come to the attention of key witnesses unknown to the parties.
These witnesses may then voluntarily come forward and give im-
portant testimony.' 6 4
The public's right to a public trial is reinforced by the lack of
any contrary right on behalf of the criminal defendant. The United
States Supreme Court has stated that "although the defendant can,
under some circumstances, waive his constitutional right to a public
trial, he has no absolute right to compel a private trial."'165 This
waiver by the defendant can be effective only insofar as the right
is his. While his allegation on appeal that his right to a public
trial was denied will not be grounds for reversal if he has effec-
tively waived his right, he cannot waive the public's right.
The Kentucky Supreme Court made the following response to
a defendant's argument that he had a right to a closed trial:
It is insisted by some the right to public trial is solely for the bene-
fit of the criminal defendant and if he has no objection to a closed
trial then the public should not be permitted to object. This con-
161. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 27D n.24 (1948); 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note
149, § 1834, at 438 n.6.
162. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 587 (1976) (Brennan,
J., concurring in the judgment). For an expansion of this quotation,
see text accompanying note 153 supra. Accord, United States v. Kobli,
172 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1949); United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077,
1087 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) ("The public has an independent right to be
present to see that justice is fairly done. [This] is important ...
to insure a sense of confidence in the judicial process. Conducting
trials behind closed doors might engender an apprehension and dis-
trust of the legal system which would, in the end, destroy its ability
to peacefully settle disputes."); United States ex rel. Mayberry v. Yea-
ger, 321 F. Supp. 199 (D.N.J. 1971); Oxnard Publishing Co. v. Superior
Court, 68 Cal. Rptr. 83 (Ct. App. 1968).
163. United States ex rel. Bennett v. Rundle, 419 F.2d 599, 606 (3d Cir.
1969). Accord, Lewis v. Peyton, 352 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1965); United
States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919, 921 (3d Cir. 1949); Snyder v. Coiner,
365 F. Supp. 321, 324 (N.D.W. Va. 1973), af-d, 510 F.2d 224 (4th
Cir. 1975); United States ex rel. Mayberry v. Yeager, 321 F. Supp.
199 (D.N.J. 1971); Oxnard Publishing Co. v. Superior Court, 68 Cal.
Rptr. 83 (Ct. App. 1968).
164. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 n.24 (1948). Accord, United States
ex rel. Bennett v. Rundle, 419 F.2d 599, 606 (3d Cir. 1969); United
States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919, 921, 923 (3d Cir. 1949); Tanksley v.
United States, 145 F.2d 58, 59 (9th Cir. 1944); Snyder V. Coiner, 365
F. Supp. 321, 324 (N.D.W. Va. 1973), af'd, 510 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1975).
165. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 35 (1965).
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tention overlooks the fact that the public is a party to all criminal
proceedings. The proceeding is prosecuted in the name of the pub-
lic. In our opinion there is nothing that better protects the rights
of the public than their presence in proceedings where these rights
are on trial..
In our opinion the question of the right of the public to
attend court proceedings and the right of the press to be there as
a part of the public is so well settled and well established that it
requires no further amplification at our hands.166
The exercise of the public's right to be present at criminal pro-
ceedings necessariy depends upon the press. In regard to this right
and the role of the press, the newspaper employee's status as a
member of the public gives him the same right to attend as other
members of the public. Any other rule would be unenforceable. If
the public can attend except for representatives of the press, then
the press simply waits outside and gets the story second-hand. This
substitution of second-hand information would help no one.167
Even more importantly, as Mr. Justice White has recognized, "in
a society in which each individual has but limited time and re-
sources with which to observe at first hand the operations of his
government, he relies necessarily upon the press to bring to him
in convenient form the facts of those operations.' 1 68  As John
Adams asked, regarding judges, among other public officials: "How
are their character and conduct to be known to their constituents
but by the press?"0 9 "There is no other way the busy ordinary
citizen can evaluate how the judicial system is administering justice
except through the media he reads, hears or watches. A free press
is the only guarantee a citizen has of his right to know what is
going on in his government." 70
166. Johnson v. Simpson, 433 S.W.2d 644, 646 (Ky. 1968).
167. See also notes 342-43 and accompanying text infra.
168. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975). But see
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). "Newsmen . . . may be
prohibited from attending or publishing information about trials if
such restrictions are necessary to assure a defendant a fair trial before
an impartial tribunal." Id. at 684-85 (dictum). Two points should
be made about this statement: (1) insofar as the statement allows
prohibitions against publishing it clearly has been rejected (Nebraska
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976)); and (2) the use of the
wod "necessary" recognizes that any vitality the statement has is
severely limited by the need to establish that closing is the least re-
strictive alternative and that, probably, burden of proof is a consid-
eration (§ IV of text infra).
169. 27 MAss. L.Q. 11, 16 (1942) (quoting Letter from John Adams to Wil-
liam Cushing, Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Boston (Mar. 7,
1789)), quoted in L. LEVY, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY
AMERICAN HISTORY 195 (1963).
170. State ex rel. Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. Phillips, 46 Ohio St. 2d 457,
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As the United States Supreme Court has recently noted, the role
of the press has a particular relationship to judicial proceedings;
the press "serves to guarantee the fairness of trials and to bring
to bear the beneficial effects of public scrutiny upon the administra-
tion of justice." 171 The role of the press relates with 'even more
particularity to the situation of the closed court. In the closed court
the censors would be the trial judges and, perhaps, magistrates and
similar officials. Those who would order proceedings closed would
be among those whose performance of official duties would be
cloaked by the closing. "Judges are men, not angels. While some
would exercise the power of censorship with high regard for the
true interests of the judicial process, others might exercise it to
prevent proper criticism of their own administration of office."17 2
2. The Extent of the Right: Pretrial Hearings
While the extent of the public's right to a public trial is less
frequently discussed than its existence, it is clear that public scru-
tiny is as important, and.perhaps can be more important, at pretrial
proceedings than at the trial itself. Take, for example, the sup-
pression hearing in which the issue is the behavior of various com-
ponents of the criminal justice system rather than the guilt of the
defendant. This right to a public trial attaches at the suppression
hearing, "because of the importance of providing an opportunity
for the public to observe judicial proceedings at which the conduct
of enforcement officials is questioned . . .rather than permit [ting]
such crucial steps in the criminal process to become associated with
secrecy.1' 73
467, 351 N.E.2d 127, 134 (1976) (emphasis added).
171. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975).
172. Rifkind, When the Press Collides with Justice, in SELECTED ESSAYS
ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 651, 653 (Ass'n of, American Law Schools
ed. 1963). See also text accompanying notes 23 and 138 supra; note
173 infra.
173. United States v. Clark, 475 F.2d 240, 246-47 (2d Cir. 1973). Accord,
e.g., United States ex rel. Bennett v. Rundle, 419 F.2d 599 (3d Cir.
1969); United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1087 (E.D.N.Y. 1971)("This right to a public trial attaches at the suppression hearing-often
the crucial stage"); United States v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 274 F. Supp. 790 (W.D. Pa. 1967); State ex rel. -Dayton
Newspapers, Inc. v. Phillips, 46 Ohio St. 2d 457, 351 N.E.2d 127 (1976).
A hearing on a motion to suppress evidence is a sensitive
and extremely important proceeding. The issues in such a
hearing are often the competence, efficiency, judgment, cour-
age and behavior of the police, the prosecutor, the defense
counsel, the court employees and the judge. Because of cor-
ruption or malice, a secret judicial proceeding may be and
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As a result of many pretrial proceedings, either the prosecution
proceeds, eventually to trial, or a defendant is set free. The po-
tential for abuse is obvious in either case-the railroaded defendant
or the railroaded public. In the latter situation, if the abuse leads
to the prosecution being dropped, who will protect the right of the
public? Certainly not the defendant. To allow that type of pretrial
proceeding to be closed would allow the one accused of wrongdoing
to negate the independent right of the public and the press who
have been guilty of no wrongdoing.1 7 4
Additionally, the pretrail hearing, like the trial, can lead to the
deprivation of the liberty of the defendant. At the conclusion of
the hearing the defendant may be committed to jail to await trial.
Further, of course, the defendant could be sentenced to jail for con-
tempt committed at the hearing without any separate hearing or
trial on the contempt charge.
To allow the pretrial proceedings to be closed would be to deny
"[o] ne of the demands of a democratic society . . . that the public
should know what goes on in courts by being told by the press
what happens there, to the end that the public may judge whether
our system of criminal justice is fair and right."175
has been used to railroad accused persons charged with crime.
Secret proceedings may be used to cover up for incompetent
and corrupt police, prosecutors and judges, and the influence
of corrupt politicians on the judicial system. The public and
the victims of crime are entitled to know what is going on.
The public is entitled to know what is happening to the ac-
cused. There is no other way the busy ordinary citizen can
evaluate how the judicial system is administering justice ex-
cept through the media he reads, hears or watches. A free
press is the only guarantee a citizen has of his right to know
what is going on in his government.
Id. at 466-67, 351 N.E.2d at 133-34.
174. This is especially intolerable in light of the alternative measures avail-
able sufficiently to protect the rights of all, including the accused.
See § IV-A of text infra. These alternatives will be available after the
pretrial proceeding has been concluded and the extent of the resulting
publicity, if any, can be assessed. Note 313 and accompanying text
infra. This is, no doubt, why the Nebraska legislature has specifically
chosen to provide that "all judicial proceedings of all courts" must
be open. NEB. REv. STAT. § 24-311 (Reissue 1975) (emphasis added).
175. Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 920 (1950) (Frank-
furter, J., opinion respecting denial of certiorari). Regarding the im-
portance of the pretrial proceeding, see Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S.
1, 9-10 (1970). But see Lingo v. Hann, 161 Neb. 67, 74, 71 N.W.2d
716, 721 (1955) (" 'A preliminary hearing before a magistrate is not
a criminal prosecution or trial within the meaning of section 11, art.
I of our Constitution.' ") (quoting Roberts v. State, 145 Neb. 658, 661,
17 N.W.2d 666, 668 (1945)). Lingo, which held the accused did not
have a right to counsel at his preliminary hearing, has been overruled
by implication by Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
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3. The Right: Nebraska
The Nebraska Constitution, Nebraska statutes, and Nebraska
common law all provide the public the right to open judicial pro-
ceedings in criminal cases, a right to be present to observe the ad-
ministration of criminal justice. The Nebraska Constitution states:
"All courts shall be open, and every person, for any injury done
him in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have a remedy
by due course of law, and justice administered without denial or
delay."'176 In addition, the Nebraska Constitution, like the sixth
amendment to the United States Constitution, guarantees the right
to a public trial.177
These constitutional provisions are backed by legislation which
clearly establishes the right of the public to the open and public
transaction of all judicial proceedings. The Nebraska statute on
the subject distinctly and imperatively states: "All judicial proceed-
ings of all courts established in this State must be open to the at-
tendance of the public unless otherwise specifically provided by
statute."'178 This statute has been on the books since 1879 in almost
exactly the same form. The only change, a significant one, came
in 1969 when the Unicameral felt impelled to further clarify its
meaning by adding that "all judicial proceedings of all courts" 179
must be open to the attendance of the public unless otherwise speci-
fically prQvided by statute.
The Nebraska Supreme Court first addressed itself to the subject
of the public's right to attend judicial proceedings in Rhoades v.
State.sa The court stated that under the Nebraska Constitution
"the general public, as such, cannot be excluded" from a criminal
trial.18' The court went on to state:
The public is admitted so that it may know that the accused is
fairly dealt with and so that his triers will be keenly alive to a
sense of their responsibility. Reasonable restrictions, for want of
space, upon the number admitted are permissible; also upon per-
sons of immature years where the evidence relates to scandalous,
indecent or immoral matters. When those present conduct them-
selves in a manner tending to obstruct justice, or tending to give
either the state or the defendant an unfair trial, the courtroom may
176. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 13.
177. Id. § 11.
178. NEB. REv. STAT. § 24-311 (Reissue 1975) (emphasis added).
179. Id. (emphasis added). The 1969 Amendment added the two italicized
words.
180. 102 Neb. 750, 169 N.W. 433 (1918).
181. Id. at 752, 169 N.W. at 434.
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be cleared of them.J18 2] Other occasions may arise when, in the
discretion of the court, such order would be permissible.'8 3
4. State v. Simants: Contrary Dictum in Nebraska
In spite of all of the above, and without any mention of the rele-
vant constitutional provisions, federal or Nebraska, or the previous
case law, and without discussion of the Nebraska statute, the Ne-
braska Supreme Court, in State v. Simants,84 in dictum, has made
one contradictory statement:
One other aspect of this case requires our attention. Counsel
for Simants asked the court below to close to the public, including
the press, such of the pretrial proceedings as might be necessary
to insure the empaneling of an impartial jury. This request the
District Court denied. Relators point out that section 24-311 ...
provides that all judicial proceedings shall be open. State and
Simants respond that the statute, if construed to apply to all pre-
trial proceedings, irrespective of how disclosures during such pro-
ceedings might affect Simants' right to be tried by an impartial jury
and affect the duty of the State to assure such impartial jury, is
then unconstitutional. We have a duty to construe statutes to make
them constitutional if possible. ABA Standard 3.1, Fair Trial and
Free Press, in our judgment supplies an applicable standard for
such construction. We, therefore, vacate the order ... and direct
the District Court to consider any applications the State or the ac-
cused may make for closed pretrial proceedings in future instances
in accord with the following standard which we adopt. ABA
Standard 3.1, Fair Trial and Free Press: "Pretrial hearings ....
"Motion to exclude public from all or part of pretrial hearing.
"In any preliminary hearing, bail hearing, or other pretrial hear-
ing in a criminal case, including a motion to suppress evidence, the
defendant may move that all or part of the hearing be held in
chambers or otherwise closed to the public, including representa-
tives of the news media, on the ground that dissemination of evi-
dence or argument adduced at the hearing may disclose matters
that will be inadmissible in evidence at the trial and is therefore
likely to interfere with his right to a fair trial by an impartial jury.
The motion shall be granted unless the presiding officer determines
that there is no substantial likelihood of such interference. With
the consent of the defendant, the presiding officer may take such
action on his own motion or at the suggestion of the prosecution.
182. The court is clearly referring to removing a person from the courtroom
because of his actions while in the courtroom, not because of actions
outside the courtroom or because of the article the reporter publishes
outside the courtroom. If the proceeding is a trial, the court can pre-
vent these sorts of out of court activities from resulting in an unfair
trial by sequestering the jury. See § IV-A-6 infra. If the proceeding
is pretrial, the myriad of other less restrictive alternatives will still
be available. See § IV-A infra.
183. 102 Neb. at 752, 169 N.W. at 434. But see State v. Simants, 194 Neb.
783, 790, 236 N.W.2d 794, 799 (1975), rev'd sub nom. Nebraska Press
Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (quoted and discussed in text
accompanying notes 185-94 infra).
184. 194 Neb. 783, 236 N.W.2d 794 (1975).
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Whenever under this rule all or part of any pretrial hearing is held
in chambers or otherwise closed to the public, a complete record
of the proceedings shall be kept and shall be made available to
the public following the completion of trial or disposition of the
case without trial. Nothing in this rule is intended to interfere with
the power of the presiding officer in any pretrial hearing to caution
those present that dissemination of certain information by any
means of public communication may jeopardize the right to a fair
trial by an impartial jury."185
The following observations about that dictum are appropriate.
First, it is "mere obiter dictum, and not binding as a precedent."'1 6
While this dictum is not authoritative, the federal' 87 and Ne-
braska 8 8 constitutional provisions, Nebraska statutes, 8 9 and ap-
plicable cases, 90 are authoritative; each of -the latter requires open
judicial proceedings in criminal cases.
Second, and perhaps ultimately most importantly, it is apparent
that Simants applied the same analysis and conclusions of law to
the closed court issue that it applied to the order forbidding publica-
tion by the press. The analysis in Simants in regard to closed pre-
trial proceedings is based upon the effect that an open pretrial pro-
ceeding might have on the defendant's right to trial by an impartial
jury. Just as surely as Simants failed to consider less restrictive
alternatives in regard to the gag order, it failed to consider less
restrictive alternatives in regard to the issue of closed pretrial pro-
ceedings. Just as surely as Simants failed to demonstrate that
without the gag order the defendant would be deprived of his right
to an impartial jury, it failed to demonstrate that without closed
pretrial proceedings the defendant would be deprived of his right
to an impartial jury. Just as surely as Simants failed to establish
that the gag order would effectively secure trial by an impartial
185. Id. at 801-02, 236 N.W.2d 794, 805-06 (1975) (quoting ABA PROJECT
ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING
TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS § 3.1 (1966)).
186. State ex tel. City of McCook v. Marsh, 107 Neb. 637, 645, 187 N.W.
84, 87 (1922). Accord, Yoder v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 140 Neb. 585, 589,
300 N.W. 840, 842 (1941) (One question before the court concerned
"[c] onstruing the dictum contained in [a previous case]"; the court
stated that "a case is not authority for any point not necessary to
be passed on in order to decide the cause."); D.J. O'Brien Co. v.
Omaha Water Co., 83 Neb. 71, 77, 118 N.W. 1110, 1113 (1908); Bliss
v. Beck, 80 Neb. 290, 295, 114 N.W. 162, 164 (.1908) ("the well-settled
rule that a case is not authority as to any point not necessary to
be passed upon in order to decide the cause"); Funke v. Allen, 54
Neb. 407, 410, 74 N.W. 832, 833 (1898).
187. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
188. NEB. CONST. art. I, §§ 11, 13; text accompanying note 178 supra.
189. Notes 178-79 and accompanying text supra.
190. See Rhoades v. State, 102 Neb. 750, 169 N.W. 433 (1918); notes 180-83
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jury, it failed to demonstrate that the closed pretrial proceeding
would effectively secure trial by an impartial jury. Just as surely
as Simants failed to present a real conflict between first and sixth
amendment rights in regard to the restrictive order therein, it failed
to present such a conflict in the issue of closed pretrial proceedings.
These two separate but related conclusions-that the press could
be gagged and that the court could be closed-were laid upon a
single foundation. When the United States Supreme Court unani-
mously reversed the restrictive order against the press it did so
largely by completely rejecting that foundational argument. The
closed hearings dictum in Simants was made for the same reasons
as, and as a result of, the analysis that was applied to the trial
court's order forbidding publication by the press. The United
States Supreme Court clearly, directly, and without doubt or dis-
sent, ruled that the Simants test was an unconstitutional test in
regard to restrictions on publication. There is no logic to any other
conclusion regarding the Simants dictum in regard to closed pro-
ceedings. As surely as the former was reversed in Nebraska Press
Association, the latter would have been reversed had it been before
the Supreme Court of the United States.
Third, the issue of closed pretrial proceedings was not raised by
the Nebraska Press Association or by the trial judge, but was raised
by counsel for Simants. Counsel for Simants was an intervenor
in the only action appropriately before the Nebraska Supreme
Court, the Nebraska Press Association's mandamus action against
the trial judge.191 Under the Nebraska intervention statute,192
reinforced by the Nebraska Supreme Court in State ex rel. Nelson
v. Butler, 93 intervenors are precluded from raising new issues. It
seems most unlikely that the two paragraphs of dicta quoted from
Simants were meant to overrule the lengthy and well-reasoned
opinion in Butler without mentioning either the Butler case or the
intervention issue. Fourth, this issue of closed pretrial proceedings,
raised by intervenor, was not briefed before the court and was ar-
gued only in passing. Finally, the author of the "Standard" refer-
and accompanying text supra.
191. In the Nebraska Supreme Court, the Nebraska Press Association at-
tempted to appeal Judge Stuart's district court order, to which Simants
was obviously a party, and to file an original mandamus action, to
which Simants was not a party, on its own behalf against Judge Stu-
art. The appeal was not allowed but the mandamus action was. Si-
mants' status in the mandamus action, at best, was that of intervenor.
State v. Simants, 194 Neb. 783, 787-88, 236 N.W.2d 794, 798 (1975).
192. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-328 (Reissue 1975).
193. 145 Neb. 638, 650, 17 N.W.2d 683, 691 (1945).
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red to in Simants, the American Bar Association, repudiated that
standard at its 1976 annual meeting by the adoption of a resolution
calling for new recommended court procedures.1
9 4
C. The Media's Right to Gather and the Public's Right to Receive
Information
1. The Right to Gather Information
The constitutional rights of the free press, under the first
amendment to the United States Constitution,'9 5 include an af-
firmative right to gather information. The conclusion that such
a right exists is logically and authoritatively inescapable. Freedom
of the press necessarily means more than just the right to publish.
In fact, the constitutional right to freedom of the press has three
component parts: gathering, publishing, and circulating. Any part
of that right without any other would be meaningless.196
The existence of the right to publish, that is, to be free from
prior restraints, is unquestioned.197 In regard to the right to cir-
culate, Chief Justice Hughes, quoting Mr. Justice Field, seemed to
be restating the obvious when he said "Liberty of circulation is as
essential to [freedom of the press] as liberty of publishing; indeed,
without the circulation, the publication would be of little value."1
9 8
194. ABA, RECOMMENDED COURT PROCEDURE TO ACCOMODATE RIGHTS OF FAIR
TRIAL AND FREE PREss (1976); 62 A.B.A. J. 1277, 1280 (1976); Com-
ment, Applying Due Process to Gag Rules and Orders, 55 NEB. L.
REV. 427 (1976).
In addition, when the ABA Standard refers to preventing disclosure
where "likely to interfere" with defendant's rights and granting the
motion to close unless the judge determines "there is no substantial
likelihood of such interference," the Standard itself mistakes the bur-
den of proof. A mere likelihood has never been enough to justify
infringement of first amendment rights. See § IV of text infra.
195. See NEB. CONST. art. I, § 5.
196. Justice Michael Musmanno expressed this point as follows:
Freedom of the press is not restricted to the operation of lino-
type machines and printing presses. A rotary press needs
raw material like a flour mill needs wheat. A print shop
without material to print would be as meaningless as a vine-
yard without grapes, an orchard without trees, or a lawn
without verdure.
Freedom of the press means freedom to gather news, write
it, publish it, and circulate it. When any one of these integral
operations is interdicted, freedom of the press becomes a river
without water.
In re Mack, 386 Pa. 251, 273, 126 A.2d 679, 689 (1956) (Musmanno,
J., dissenting). Accord, Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 976 (2d Cir.
1977).
197. See § III-A of text supra.
198. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938) (quoting Ex parte
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And, the Chief Justice might have added, without a right to gather
information, the right of publication would be of little value.
Regarding the right to gather, the press, to fulfill its vital
role, necessarily depends on its ability to acquire the informa-
tion it intends to disseminate. "The right to gather news would
appear to be as basic to a free press as the right to publish." 199
"Without the opportunity to gather and obtain the news, the right
to publish or to comment upon it, would be of little value. ' '20 0 With-
out the right to gather information "freedom of the press could
be eviscerated."
20 1
In Branzburg v. Hayes,20 2 the United States Supreme Court ex-
plicitly recognized the existence of a right to gather information
as a part of the first amendment right to freedom of the press.20 3
A corollary of the right to publish must be the right to gather
news. The full flow of information to the public protected by the
free-press guarantee[ 20 4 1 would be severely curtailed if no protec-
tion whatever were afforded to the process by which news is as-
sembled and disseminated. We have, therefore, recognized that
there is a right to publish without prior government approval....
a right to distribute information .... and a right to receive printed
material.
Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877)). See also Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc.,
327 U.S. 146, 156-57 n.18 (1946); Oral Argument Transcript, at 53-
54, Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). While Mr.
Justice Marshall was questioning the Nebraska Assistant Attorney
General as to whether or not the preliminary hearing in the Simants
case was a public hearing, the following exchange occurred:
Question: .... It was public except for the press?
Mr. Mosher: Well, even the press, the way the case was
developed was entitled to attend.
Question: They could hear it but they couldn't publish it.
Mr. Mosher: That's correct.
Question: Well, I don't know how any newspaper can ex-
ist if all it does is hear.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 53-54. It is equally true that no news-
paper can exist if it cannot hear.
199. THE MEDIA AND THE LAw 23 (H. Simons & J. Califano eds. 1976).
200. Kovach v. Maddux, 238 F. Supp. 835, 839 (M.D. Tenn. 1965).
201. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 681, 707 (majority opinion); id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring);
id. at 720-24 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 727-28 (Stewart, J., dis-
senting). See also Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 859,
861 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting); KQED v. Houchins, 546 F:2d 284,
285 (9th Cir. 1976); Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know,
1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 1, 20; Note, The Right of the Press to Gather Infor-
mation, 71 CoLum. L. REV. 838 (1971); Note, The Rights of the Public
and the Press to Gather Information, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1505 (1974).
204. On numerous other occasions, the Supreme Court has recognized the
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No less important to the news dissemination process is the
gathering of information. News must not be unnecessarily cut off
at its source, for without freedom to acquire information the right
to publish would be impermissibly compromised. Accordingly, a
right to gather news, of some dimensions, must exist.2 05
2. The Right to Receive Information
Not only does the media have a right to gather and disseminate
information, but the public 'has a long recognized complimentary
right to receive information. 20 6 The Supreme Court has recognized
this right most recently in two "commercial speech" cases. In Lin-
mark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro,20 7 the Court, in the
process of striking down a city ordinance prohibiting the posting
of real estate "For Sale" and "Sold" signs, referred to both the
speaker and the listener's "First Amendment interest in the subject
matter of the speech that is regulated here."20 8 In Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,20 9
free flow of information as a basic objective of the first amendment.
See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 41-42 (1971); Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 395 U.S.
367, 390 (1969); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967); Grosjean
v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243 (1936). This flow cannot
be protected unless acquisition, publication and dissemination are pro-
tected.
205. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 727-28 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissent-
ing) (citations omitted). It is significant to note that the majority
in Branzburg refused to create a testimonial privilege for reporters
called before a grand jury because the Court found that the reporter's
claim that such compulsory testimony would inhibit his right to gather
information (from informants) was largely speculative. In the instant
case, however, the proposed inhibition of the right to gather informa-
tion is not in the least speculative. On the contrary, since the very
purpose of the closing order would be to maintain secrecy, the inhibi-
tion would be unmistakably clear. In fact, it is the effect of an open
hearing on defendant's rights which is, at most, speculative. See
§ IV-B of text infra. See also, e.g., Schnell v. City of Chicago, 407
F.2d 1084 (7th Cir. 1969) (a cause of action was stated by reporters
for a denial of their first amendment right to gather and report news);
Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Periodical Correspondents'
Ass'n, 365 F. Supp. 18, 26 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 515
F:2d 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ("Access, to news, if unreasonably or arbi-
trarily denied by congressional action or publishers meeting under
congressional auspices, constitutes a direct limitation upon the content
of news, as recognized in Branzburg.").
206. See generally Emerson, supra note 203, at 6-7; Note, The Constitutional
Right to Know, 4 HAST'MGS CONST. L.Q. 109 (1977).
207. 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
208. Id. at 92.
209. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). See also Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc. v. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 373 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Va.
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the Court held that a state statute barring advertisements by phar-
macists violated the consumer's right to receive information.
210
Procunier v. Martinez21' recognized a right to receive personal
correspondence. 212 Lamont v. Postmaster General21s held that a
federal statutory requirement that foreign mailings of "Communist
political propaganda" be delivered only upon request by the ad-
dressee violated the addressee's first amendment rights.214 In Mar-
tin v. City of Struthers2 1 5 the Court overturned a municipal ordi-
nance forbidding door-to-door distribution of religious handbills as
violative of the first amendment rights of both the distributor and
the recipients. 216 The right to receive was one basis for the decision
in Thomas v. Collins,21 7 in which the Supreme Court "held that
a labor organizer's right to speak and the rights of workers 'to hear
what he had to say,'. . . were both abridged by a state law requir-
ing organizers to register before soliciting union membership."'21 '
Kleindienst v. Mandel,219 a case involving the exclusion of an
alien who had scheduled a speaking tour in this country, acknow-
ledged a first amendment right to receive information but deferred
to Congress' plenary power to exclude aliens. In Stanley v.
Georgia220 the state had criminalized private possession of porno-
graphic materials. While declaring the state statute unconstitu-
tional, the Supreme Court stated that under first amendment
speech and press principles "[i] t is now well established that the
-Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas ....
This right to receive information and ideas . . . is fundamental to
our free society."221 And even in Griswold v. Connecticut2 22 the
1974) (lower court decision).
210. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 753 (1976). This case was litigated not by those
whose speech was restricted (pharmacists) but by those whose receipt
of information was restricted (one individual consumer and two con-
sumer organizations).
211. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
212. See id. at 408-09.
213. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
214. Id. at 305, 307.
215. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
216. Id. at 143, 149. See also Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 505, 508-
09 (1946).
217. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
218. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 763 (1972) (quoting Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 534 (1945)).
219. 408 U.S. 753, 762-65 (1972).
220. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
221. Id. at 564 (citations omitted).
222. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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Court referred to a right to receive as within the penumbra of first
amendment freedoms of speech and press.223 "Recognition of the
right to receive is . . .a significant step toward a comprehensive
right to know; it is grounded on the same fundamental bases as
the right to know, and it established that First Amendment cover-
age extends to both ends of the flow of information.1224
3. The Effect of the Right to Gather and Receive
In the face of the above, it is futile to deny the existence of
a right to gather information and a right to receive information.
On the other hand, no one argues that these two rights are ab-
solute.225 The media neither has nor claims an absolute right to
know, an absolute right td gather whatever information, private
or even public, strikes their fancy; and the public has no absolute
right to receive everything. What this does mean is that each of
these rights exists and each must be reckoned with.
While neither right is absolute, each provides some protection.
The protection provided is two-fold. First, these rights not only
strengthen, but independently support the conclusion that the
media has procedural due process rights in regard to the closing
of the court. Second, these rights do provide some substantive pro-
tection. While they are not absolute, neither can the government
simply disregard them. There must be some demonstrated good
reason for their infringement. It takes more than just conclusions,
more than just allegations, more than just the kind of speculation
condemned in Nebraska Press Association.226
In addition, the rights to gather and to receive information are
not considered in the abstract. The media need not place all of their
reliance on their right to gather information or the public's right
to receive information. These two rights apply in this situation
223. Id. at 482. Regarding the general right to receive information, see
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 872 (1974) (Powell, J.,
dissenting), and Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communica-
tions Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
224. Note, supra note 206, at 137.
225. See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. .1 (1965). In Zemel the plaintiff chal-
lenged the State Department's refusal to authorize his travel to Cuba,
alleging a sort of first amendment right of the individual to receive
or to gather information. The Supreme Court held that this was a
restriction on action and not protected by the first amendment. The
Court went on to state that "[t] he right to speak and publish does
not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information." Id.
at 17 (emphasis added).
226. See notes 320, 325-34 and accompanying text infra.
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in combination with the media's constitutional right to be free from
prior restraints and the constitutional right to public judicial pro-
ceedings in criminal cases. This combination of rights put the
media in a very strong position.227
IV. PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS: THE BURDEN OF PROOF
Ultimately the first amendment right to freedom of the press
is not an absolute right, although as a restriction on prior restraints
on the press it is nearly absolute. 228 It is, however, a right which
cannot be infringed until those who would do so have met a very
strict and demanding burden of proof. Once it is found that first
amendment rights are being or will be infringed, the burden of
proof is on those who would infringe those rights, and not on those
who would assert them. It is the infringement and not the assertion
of the right which must be justified. 229 Because "the line between
speech unconditionally guaranteed and speech which may legiti-
mately be regulated . . . is finely drawn . . . [and t] he separation
of legitimate from illegitimate speech calls for . . . sensitive
tools ' '230 and because "it is plain that where the burden of proof
lies may be decisive of the outcome," 23 ' the Supreme Court has held
227. As a general rule, a combination of constitutional rights puts the liti-
gant asserting those rights in a stronger position than only one (or
even any number less than all) of the rights. However, the free press
proscription against prior restraints is so very nearly absolute that
the litigant suffering an infringement of that right could hardly be
litigating from a stronger position. The combination of rights concept
becomes important insofar as one disputes the conclusion that the
closed judicial proceeding works a prior restraint on the media or,
if one believes that whether such a closing constitutes a prior restraint
is a close question, in shifting the balance in the resolution of that
"close question."
228. See notes 88 and 91 supra.
229. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 558-59, 569-
70 (1976); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976); Cousins v. Wigoda,
419 U.S. 477, 489 (1975); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403
U.S. 713 (1971); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438-39 (1963); Speiser
v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 528-29 (.1958).
The governing principle is that the press, in general, is to
be free and unrestrained and that the facts are presumed to
be in the public domain. The accused, and the prosecution
if it joins him, bears the burden of showing that publicizing
particular facts will irreparably impair the ability of those
exposed to them to reach an independent and impartial judg-
ment as to guilt.
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 423 U.S. 1327, 1333 (1975) (Blackmun,
J., Circuit Justice).
230. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958).
231. Id.
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that "the burden of proof should operate to decide close cases in
favor of the speech's being found protected." 23 2
The burden of proof on those who would close the court in a
criminal action contains at least three elements: the burden of
establishing that closing the proceeding is the least restrictive alter-
native, the burden of establishing that closing the proceeding will
'effectively secure the desired end, and the burden of establishing
that the defendant will be deprived of his rights if the proceeding
is not closed.233 These burdens must be demonstrably overcome
on the record. Judicial conclusions to the effect that these burdens
of proof have been satisfied are not sufficient.23 4  Further, "the
burden [of proof] on the Government is not reduced by the tempor-
ary nature of a restraint."235
Not only is the burden of proof on those who would close the
proceeding, but there are certain constitutionally mandated pro-
cedural safeguards which govern how the court must proceed in
such a situation. Adequate notice of an impending consideration
of a closed court order must be given to all involved, including re-
presentatives of the media, and an evidentiary hearing, adversary
in nature, must be held to supply a factual basis for any such order
in order to make a record on each of the three elements of the
burden of proof.236 Absent these procedural safeguards, such an
order would not only violate substantive constitutional rights, but
also the fourteenth amendment rights to procedural due process.
A. The Burden is on Those Who Would Close the Court to Prove
That There Are No Less Restrictive Alternatives
First, and perhaps most importantly, those who would close the
proceeding must establish that doing so is the least restrictive alter-
232. Monaghan, supra note 38, at 546.
233. E.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562-67 (1976); id.
at 571 (Powell, J., concurring). See also Miller v. Kentucky, 40 F.2d
820 (6th Cir. 1930).
234. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 593 (1976) (Brennan,
J., concurring in the judgment). See also id. at 563, 565; Wood v.
Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 386-88 (1962).
235. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976). See also id.
at 580 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (referring to the
partial stay of the district court's order in Nebraska Press Ass'n v.
Stuart, 423 U.S. 1327, 1329 (1975) (Blackmun, J., Circuit Justice), as
"concluding that each passing day constituted an irreparable infringe-
ment on First Amendment values").
236. See § II of text supra.
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native available; all other alternatives, short of infringing first
amendment rights, must be shown to be ineffective. 237
"There are many ways to try to assure the kind of impartial
jury that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees," 238 many "proce-
dures . . . sufficient to guarantee . . . a fair trial" 239 short of in-
fringing first amendment rights. Prior restraints on news report-
ing by the press are not, and never have been, among the available
tools for the protection of the rights of the defendant in a criminal
case. This ban on prior restraints is workable in criminal cases
in part because of this myriad of effective and less restrictive alter-
natives available for the protection of the defendant. Indeed, these
less restrictive alternatives seem to satisfy the requirement that the
237. E.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562-65 (1976); id.
at 571 (Powell, J., concurring); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453
(1972); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 522 (1972); Carroll v. Presi-
dent of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 183 (1968); Sheppard v. Maxwell,
384 U.S. 333, 357-58 (1966); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407
(1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960); Cantwell v. Con-
necticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940); New York Times Co. v. Starkey,
51 App. Div. 2d 60, 64, 380 N.Y.S.2d 239, 243-44 (1976) ("All other
measures within the power of the court to insure a fair trial must
be found to be unavailing or deficient.").
See also United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977);
Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951)- (a barrier
to interstate commerce will not be acceptable if there is a less restric-
tive alternative). In United States Trust Co., the Court noted that
it "is customary in reviewing economic and social regulation, [that]
courts properly defer to legislative judgment as to the necessity and
reasonableness of a particular measure." 431 U.S. at 22-23. The Court
recognized that United States Trust Co. is that type of case but went on
to state that "a State is not free to impose a drastic impairment when
an evident and more moderate course would serve its purposes equally
well." Id. at 31. The Court concluded that the state had failed to
demonstrate the necessity for the alternative it chose. Id. In United
States Trust Co., the Supreme Court used a less, if not least, restrictive
alternative analysis as a part of a reasonableness test. The Court
held at a minimum that, if there is an alternative which does not
impair the constitutional right, that alternative must be chosen regard-
less of whether the right is a fundamental right unless those who
would infringe the right can demonstrate the necessity of choosing
their alternative. See Scott v. Scott, [1913i A.C. 417, 438 (Viscount
Haldane, L.C.) (Before the Courts of England can be closed, those
who would close them have the burden of proof and they "must satisfy
the Court that by nothing short of the exclusion of the public can
justice be done.").
238. Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505, 509 (1971).
239. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358 (1966). See also Times-Pic-
ayune Publishing Corp. v. Schulingkamp, 419 U.S. 1301, 1308 (1974)
(opinion in chambers of Powell, J.).
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defendant's fair trial right be protected without any need to resort
to infringement of the media's constitutional rights whether by
prior restraint or not. The mandate of Nebraska Press Association
is that these alternatives must be used.240
This does not suggest that the end, a fair trial, cannot be
achieved, but simply that infringing first amendment rights is not
the way to do it. This does not deny the authority to solve the
problem. When first amendment rights are the issue, those who
would close the court must make a clear showing that there is no
less drastic means of effecting the permissible end before the limita-
tion of first amendment rights can ever be considered.
The available less restrictive, but effective, alternatives, to be
used singly or in combination, include: voir dire, change of venire,
change of venue, continuance, enforcement of courtroom decorum,
sequestration of jurors, judicial instructions, control over courtroom
personnel and officers of the court, mistrials, new trials, and rever-
sals.
1. Voir Dire
The voir dire examination of prospective jurors is a powerful
tool for counteracting the effects of publicity. The United States
Supreme Court places great falth in the use of voir dire to screen
out prejudiced jurors and to impress upon others their duty to de-
cide only on the basis of the evidence admitted at trial.241 InNe-
240. 427 U.S. at 562-65.
241. E.g., id. at 564; id. at 602 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment);
Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 800-03 (1975) (voir dire found to
be an adequate safeguard to the accused's right to an impartial jury
in a highly publicized case); Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524
(1973) (use of voir dire to screen out racially prejudiced jurors); Beck
v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 556-57 (1962).
See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 218 n.24 (1965). See also
Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184, 209 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert.
denied sub nom. Calley v. Hoffman, 425 U.S. 911 (1976) (voir dire
in "My-Lai Massacre" trial of Lt. Calley insured fair trial); Margoles
v. United States, 407 F.2d 727, 730 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
833 (1969); United States v. Mitchell, 389 F. Supp. 917, 920 (D.D.C.
1975), aff'd, 559 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933,
application for suspension denied, 431 U.S. 935 (1977) (former Attor-
ney General John Mitchell's motions regarding pretrial publicity
deferred until after the voir dire, at which time the court concluded
that exhaustive voir dire examination and a continuance assured the
accused of a fair trial); Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonder-
ful Power, 27 STAN. L. RaV. 545 (1975).
Regarding an empirical study which indicates that voir dire re-
duces the effect of prejudicial extra judicial information, see Simon,
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braska, the supreme court has recently recognized the ameliorative
effect of "the care exercised ... in the selection of the jury."242
If necessary, voir dire can be conducted with prospective jurors
individually or in small groups.243 This will facilitate a more effec-
tive voir dire by making it more likely that prejudices can be dis-
covered and avoiding contamination of the rest of the panel by a
prospective juror who has been influenced by publicity. For addi-
tional protection, the allowable number of peremptory challenges
can be increased244 and the defendant can be given the benefit of
the doubt on challenges for cause.
245
The court can also voir dire jurors after the trial has begun
to assess the effect, if any, of potentially prejudicial information
which may have come to the attention of jurors after they were
sworn but before they reached a verdict. If a juror has been preju-
diced, he can be dismissed and the trial continued with an alternate
Does the Court's Decision in Nebraska Press Association Fit the Re-
search Evidence on the Impact on Jurors of News Coverage?, 29 STAN.
L. REV. 515, 525-26 (1977). But see Schmidt, Nebraska Press Associa-
tion: An Expansion of Freedom and Contraction of Theory, 29 STAN.
L. REv. 431, 449 (1977) (concluding that the results of empirical stud-
ies are inconsistent and the experiments themselves "fall too far short
of reality to provide convincing evidence").
242. State v. Ell, 196 Neb. 800, 806, 246 N.W.2d 594, 598 (1976). See also
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-1636, 29-2006 (Reissue 1975).
243. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 602 (1976) (Brennan,
J., concurring in the judgment); United States, v. Titsworth, 422 F.
Supp. 587 (D. Neb. 1976).
244. People v. Speck, 41 Ill. 2d 177, 213, 242 N.E.2d 208, 227 (1968); Note,
The Discretionary Power to Grant Additional Peremptory Challenges
in Highly Publicized Criminal Trials: Securing a Fair and Impartial
Trial, 25 BUFFALO L. REV. 545, 557 (1976).
In Nebraska, as in many other jurisdictions, the legislature has
placed limits on the number of peremptory challenges. NEB. REv.
STAT. § 29-2005 (Reissue 1975) (twelve for the defense and 10 for
the prosecution in capital or life imprisonment cases, six in cases in
which a sentence of more than 18 months is possible, and three in
all other criminal trials). However, if the choice were between that
statutory limit and freedom of the press, the statutory limit would
be unconstitutional as applied. See notes 256-61 and accompanying
text infra. In People v. Speck, 41 Ill. 2d 177, 213, 242 N.E.2d 208,
227 (1968), Richard Speck was permitted to exercise 160 peremptory
challenges even though under the applicable Illinois statute (ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-4(e) (Smith-Hurd 1977)) he was entitled
to only 20.
245. See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 51 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No.
14,693) (Marshall, C.J., Circuit Justice). Chief Justice Marshall stated
"that light impressions which may fairly be supposed to yield to the
testimony" do not disqualify a juror, "but ... those strong and deep
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juror,246 or a new trial can be ordered.247 Not only can the voir
dire be of benefit in keeping prejudiced persons off the jury and
in impressing those chosen with their duty as jurors, but it can
also be of great benefit in assessing the need for the use of other
less restrictive alternatives such as a change of venue or a continu-
ance.
248
2. Change of Venire
Similarly, in most cases the panel of prospective jurors may be
enlarged 249 or an entirely new panel may be called. 250  As addi-
tional protection, some jurisdictions specifically provide for calling
a foreign jury.251 Even absent such a specific provision, drawing
jurors from another county, where jurisdictionally possible, could
provide a possible alternative remedy to prejudicial pretrial pub-
licity.252
impressions which will close the mind against the testimony" suffice
for a challenge for cause. Id.
246. See State v. Allen, 73 N.J. 132, -, 373 A.2d 377, 391 (1977) (Pashman,
J., concurring).
247. United States v. Titsworth, 422 F. Supp. 587 (D. Neb. 1976). After
six and one-half hours of deliberation, at 10:05. p.m., the jury ad-
journed until 8:45 the next morning, at which time they reconvened
and, approximately 25 minutes later, returned a guilty verdict. De-
fense counsel then informed the court of a news story the previous
evening which recited allegedly prejudicial information. "[T]he
Court examined each juror individually in chambers with respect to
his exposure to the publicity." Id. at 589. After conferring with thejurors, the judge ordered a new trial. See also State v. Allen, 73
N.J. 132, -, 373 A.2d 377, 391 (1977) (Pashman, J., concurring).
248. E.g., United States v. Mitchell, 389 F. Supp. 917- (D.D.C. 1975), aff'd,
559 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied,.431 U.S. 933, application
for suspension denied, 431 U.S. 935 (1977) (discussed at note 225 su-
pra); United States v. Kahaner, 204 F. Supp. 921, 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1962),
aff'd, 317 F.2d 459 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 836 (1963)("Whether or not the publicity has been of such a nature that the
selection of a fair and impartial jury is foreclosed at this time cannot
be determined until jurors are questioned on the voir dire.").
249. In an appropriate case the pool from which prospective jurors are
drawn may also be made smaller in an effort to protect defendant's
right to a fair trial. In United States v. Holovachka, 314 F.2d 345
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 809 (1963), the court affirmed the
federal district court's exclusion from the jury list of residents of the
counties served by the newspapers which had published articles alleg-
edly prejudicial to the defendant's right to a fair trial.
250. E.g., Note, Community Hostility and the Right to an Impartial Jury,
60 COLUM. L. REv. 349, 365-67 (1960).
251. E.g., State v. Allen, 73 N.J. 132, -, 373 A.2d 377, 383 (1977); id. at
-, 373 A.2d at 391 (Pashman, J., concurring).
252. E.g., United States v. Holovachka, 314 F.2d 345 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
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3. Change of Venue
Obviously, a change of venue may protect against jury preju-
dice.2 53 The change of venue to secure an impartial jury may be
granted upon motion of the defendant or the prosecution or upon
the court's own motion; in other words a change of venue may be
granted even if the defendant is not requesting such a change.254
Clearly a change of venue causes some inconvenience for the judici-
ary, the prosecutorial staff, the defendant, and the witnesses. How-
ever, inconvenience has never been a good and sufficient reason
for the infringement of constitutional rights.
In regard to the use of this less restrictive alternative in Ne-
braska, a Nebraska statute provides that venue in a criminal action
"may" be changed to "some adjoining county" when it appears "that
a fair impartial trial cannot be had" in the county in which the
offense was committed. 25 5 This statute could be interpreted in one
of three ways. First, the statute can be interpreted as barring any
transfer which places the trial in a county which does not adjoin
the one in which the crime was committed. Second, the "may"
could be interpreted as a discretionary guideline rather than as an
absolute limit. Third, the statute could be interpreted as allowing
the court before which the case is initially brought the authority
to transfer it to any adjoining county. The judge to whom the
374 U.S. 809 (1963) (jury panel drawn from two different counties
within trial court's district).
253. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 563 (1976); id. at 602-
03 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment); Sheppard v. Maxwell,
384 U.S. 333, 362-63 (1966); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); Shep-
herd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50, 52-53 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring);
Note, The Efficacy of a Change of Venue in Protecting a Defendant's
Right to an Impartial Jury, 42 NOTRE DAME LAW. 925 (1967). See
Zediker v. State, 114 Neb. 292, 207 N.W. 168 (1926); Olsen v. State,
114 Neb. 112, 206 N.W. 1 (1925); Gandy v. Estate of Bissell, 81 Neb.
102, 115, 1.15 N.W. 571, 575 (1908); Lucas v. State, 75 Neb. 11, 15-17, 105
N.W. 976, 977-78 (1905). See also State v. Ell, 196 Neb. 800, 806, 246
N.W.2d 594, 598 (1976).
Certainly there could be cases in which prejudicial pretrial pub-
licity is state-wide or in which the publicity will follow the defendant.
All this means is that the selection of alternatives must be based on
the facts of the particular case. Surely it does not deny the general
validity of the alternative. Additionally the change of venue used
in combination with one or more of the other alternatives could well
protect the defendant's rights.
254. E.g., State ex rel. Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. Phillips, 46 Ohio St.
2d 457, 475, 351 N.E.2d 127, 138 (1976) (Stern, J., concurring); Ranney,
Remedies For Prejudicial Publicity: A Brief Review, 21 VIML. L. REV.
819, 830 (1976).
255. NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-1301 (Reissue 1975).
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case is transferred could then decide whether the defendant could
get a fair trial in that second county. If he decides not, then he
can grant another change of venue to any county adjoining that
second county, whether it adjoins the first county or not, and so
on. The trial could be held across the state from where the crime
was committed so long as each county to which the case is trans-
ferred adjoins the one from which it was last transferred.
If the first of the above interpretations is followed-if it is read
as an absolute bar against any transfer further than a county ad-
joining the one in which the crime was committed-it cannot sur-
vive constitutional challenge. The United States Supreme Court
said as much in Nebraska Press Association in regard to this very
Nebraska statute. "We have held that state laws restricting venue
must on occasion yield to the constitutional requirement that the
State afford a fair trial."25 6  There can be no question but that
the statute would be unconstitutional were it interpreted as provid-
ing that when a fair and impartial jury cannot be impanelled in
the county where the offense was committed or in any adjoining
county, the defendant must nonetheless be tried in one of those
counties, either forgoing his right to a trial by jury or accepting
a jury or judge which is not fair and impartial. "No legislation
could be valid that in any manner limits or modifies this right."
2s7
It would be even more ridiculous to suggest that rather than ex-
panding the area for venue changes the defendant could not be
tried. It is equally clear that such a statute cannot be used as
an excuse for infringing first amendment rights.258
256. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 563 n.7 (1976) (citing
Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505 (1971)). Accord, e.g., Nebraska
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 602-03 (1976) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring in the judgment); State v. Mejia, 250 La. 518, 527, 197 So. 2d
73, 76 (1967) (A second removal was ordered, though to do so was
contrary to state law. "A finding that an impartial jury could not
be selected to try the accused is the strongest reason for disregarding
a legislative pronouncement which would deny the removal."); Lucas
v. State, 75 Neb. 11, 15-17, 105 N.W. 976, 976-78 (1905) (legislation
limiting the right to "public trial 'by an impartial jury'" could not
be valid).
257. Lucas v. State, 75 Neb. 11, 16, 105 N.W. 976, 978 (1905).
258. In Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961), the Supreme Court held thejudgment of a state trial court unconstitutional for having refused
to grant defendant's motion for a second change of venue, made neces-
sary by pretrial publicity, even though that state's statute did not
specifically provide for a second change of venue. In Rideau v. Lou-
isiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963), the Supreme Court held that refusal to
grant defendant's request for a change of venue when necessary to
protect his sixth amendment rights was a denial of due process.
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Such an interpretation of this statate would not only violate the
first and sixth amendment rights, but also the criminal defendant's
fourteenth amendment right to equal protection of the law. Section
25-410 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes, provides that "in the inter-
est of justice" a civil action can be transferred to any other county
in the state.259 To allow such a broad change of venue in a civil
case and a change of venue only to an adjoining county in a criminal
case constitutes an unreasonable difference in treatment of the class
of criminal defendants in violation of the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment.260  Further, even if this difference
in treatment were arguably reasonable, first amendment rights are
at stake, and sixth amendment rights are potentially involved.
Therefore the legislature must demonstrate a "compelling state in-
-terest" in so distinguishing between the criminal and civil defend-
ant.261 Such a compelling state interest, of course, could not be
demonstrated here.
If we recognize, as we must, that modern communication media
pose problems for fair trials different from those in our country's
early days, we should also recognize that the speed and ease of
modern transportation greatly reduces the burden imposed by mov-
ing a trial to another county .... [T]here appears little reason
why the trial court should struggle to keep the trial in the county,
when to do so .,. . prevent [s] the residents of the county from
actually being informed about one of the crucial stages of the trial
process [in this case a hearing on a motion to suppress]. The pub-
lic [andf the press .. all stand to lose much and gain little from
such a decision. 20 2
4. Continuance
Of course, there is nothing that proscribes the press from reporting
events that transpire in the courtroom. But where there is a rea-
259. "For the convenience of the parties and witnesses or in the interest
of justice, a district court of any county may transfer any civil action
to the district court of any other county in this state." NEB. REV.
STAT. § 25-410 (Reissue 1975). On January 4, 1978, a bill was intro-
duced in the Nebraska Unicameral which would allow a change of
venue in criminal cases, upon motion of the defendant, to counties
other than those adjoining the county in which the crime was com-
mitted. L.B. 562, 85th Leg., 2d Sess. § 1 (1978).
260. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71, 75-76 (1971); Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415
(1920).
261. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 433 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969); DeGregory v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 825,
829 (1966); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 439 (1963); Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
262. State ex rel. Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. Phillips, 46 Ohio St. 2d 457,
475-76, 351 N.E.2d 127, 138 (1976) (Stern, J., concurring).
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sonable likelihood that prejudicial news prior to trial will prevent
a fair trial, the judge should continue the case until the threat
abates, or transfer it to another county not so permeated with pub-
licity.263
As Chief Judge Brown of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
has stated, "It is the nature of news that it is so readily forgotten-
time can erase impressions, even sensational ones. Thus, while
prejudicial news coverage may poison the minds of jurors or im-
mediate prospective jurors for the present, the contamination may
be only temporary ... ."264 The United States Supreme Court
has recognized that even a short delay 265 between an arrest accom-
panied by massive publicity and the subsequent trial can insure a
fair trial.2 66 The Nebraska Supreme Court has also recently recog-
263. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362-63 (1966) (emphasis added).
264. United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496, 507-08 (5th Cir. 1972)
(Brown, C.J.). Accord, Dowling, Fair Trial v. Free Press: Proposals
for Statutory Reform, 3 U.S.F. L. REv. 49, 69-70 (1968).
265. Of course too long a delay could result in speedy trial problems. See
notes 266-67 infra.
266. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 563-64 (1976) ("postpone-
ment of the trial to allow public attention to subside"); id. at 602
n.28 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) ("And somewhat sub-
stantial delays designed to ensure fair proceedings need not transgress
the speedy trial guarantee."); Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 802
(1975) (seven month period of delay); Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S.
541, 556-57 (1962) (nine and one-half month period of delay). Accord,
Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184, 208 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert.
denied sub nom. Calley v. Hoffman, 425 U.S. 911 (1976); United States
v. Collins, 472 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied sub nom. Branch
v. United States, 411 'U.S. 983 (1973); United States v. Dioguardi, 147
F. Supp. 421, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); A. FRIENDLY & R. GOLDFARB, CRIME
AND PUBLICITY 96-101 (1967). But see Isaacson, Fair Trial and Free
Press: An Opportunity for Coexistence, 29 STAN. L. REv. 561, 562
(1977).
See also Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (1976). The
Act provides in part:
(h) The. following periods of delay shall be excluded in
computing the time within which an information or an indict-
ment might be filed, or in computing the time within which
the trial of any such offense might commence:(8) (A) Any period of delay resulting from a continu-
ance granted by any judge on his own motion or at the
request of the defendant or his counsel or at the request
of the attorney for the Government, if the judge granted
such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends
of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best
interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
No such period of delay resulting from a continuance
granted by the court in accordance with this paragraph
shall be excludable under this subsection unless the court
sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in
writing, its reason for finding that the ends of justice
served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the
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nized the ameliorative effect of "the length of time between the
dissemination of the publicity complained of and the date of the
trial.,267
In those situations in which the impressions of the jurors or pro-
spective jurors arguably will not be erased so easily, as in the small
town where the victims of the crime were well known, the impres-
sions may be erased more quickly in other judicial districts. In
that situation the continuance can be effectively combined with the
change of venue, exhaustive voir dire, and judicial instrubtion.
5. Enforcement of Courtroom Decorum
Another less restrictive alternative involves enforcing courtroom
decorum. Although at first it may seem to be stretching the point
to include an item like courtroom decorum, in what is perhaps
the most famous prejudicial publicity case to be handed down by
the United States Supreme Court2 68 it was, in considerable part,
the failure of the trial judge to enforce proper courtroom decorum,
both at pretrial proceedings and during the trial itself, which denied
the defendant's right to a fair trial. This was the less restrictive
alternative first discussed in Sheppard v. Maxwell.269
In Sheppard, in addition to what the Court characterized as
virulent publicity about [the defendant] and the murder .... only
best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy
trial. (B) The factors, among others, which a judge shall
consider in determining whether to grant a continuance
under subparagraph (A) of this paragraph in any case
are as follows:(i) Whether the failure to grant such a continu-
ance in the proceeding would be likely to make a
continuation of such proceeding impossible, or result
in a miscarriage of justice.
267. State v. Ell, 196 Neb. 800, 806, 246 N.W.2d 594, 598 (1976). Nebraska
statutes require that criminal trials commence within six months of
the date the accused is charged, NEB. REV. STAT. §-§ 29-1205 to 1208
(Reissue 1975), unless defendant waives his right to a speedy trial.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 11. See NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 29-1207 (4) (b) (Reissue 1975). Such a strict requirement of so short
a time, like the Nebraska statutory limitation on change of venue,
see § IV-A-3 of text supra, and on peremptory challenges, see note
244 and accompanying text supra, may be unconstitutional when ap-
plied to infringe the first amendment rights of the press. This does
not mean, however, that the continuance may be indefinite in spite
of the constitutional speedy trial requirement, only that something
in excess of six months may nevertheless be "speedy."
268. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 354 (1966).
269. Id. at 358. See also Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539,
601 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
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three months before trial, Sheppard was examined for more than
five hours without counsel during a three-day inquest which ended
in a public brawl. The inquest was televised live from a high
school gymnasium seating hundreds of people. Furthermore, the
trial began two weeks before a hotly contested election at which
both Chief Prosecutor Mahon and Judge Blythin were candidates
for judgeships. 270
At this televised inquest,
Sheppard was brought into the room by police who searched him
in full view of several hundred spectators. Sheppard's counsel
were present during the three-day inquest but were not permitted
to participate. When Sheppard's chief counsel attempted to place
some documents in the record, he was forcibly ejected from the
room by the Coroner, who received cheers, hugs, and kisses from
ladies in the audience. Sheppard was questioned for five and one-
half hours about his actions on the night of the murder, his married
life, and a love affair with Susan Hayes.271
As for the trial itself,
[t]he fact is that bedlam reigned at the courthouse ... and news-
men took over practically the entire courtroom, hounding most of
the participants in the trial, especially Sheppard. At a temporary
table within a few feet of the jury box and counsel table sat some
20 reporters .... Having assigned almost all of the available
seats in the courtroom to the news media the judge lost his ability
to supervise that environment. The movement of the reporters in
and out of the courtroom caused frequent confusion and disruption
of the trial.272
One could hardly imagine such a carnival-like atmosphere had
it not actually happlened. The point is that the trial judge must
maintain control; the dignity and decorum of the courtroom must
be enforced. Cameras and microphones can be kept out of the
courtroom 273 and order can be kept among the spectators, the public
and the press alike, and the participants.2T4
270. 384 U.S. at 354.
271. Id. at 339-40.
272. Id. at 355.
273. FED. R. CRnvr. P. 53, for example, prohibits filming and photographing
in federal courtrooms. See also Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965),
(pretrial and trial proceedings were televised). In Estes, the Supreme
Court held that the combined effect of the television cameras on the
jury, the witnesses, the judge, and the defendant produced an inherent
lack of due process.
274. The carnival atmosphere at trial could easily have been
avoided since the courtroom and courthouse premises are sub-ject to the control of the court .... The number of reporters
in the courtroom itself could have been limited at the first
sign that their presence would disrupt the trial. They cer-
tainly should not have been placed inside the bar. Further-
more, the judge should have more closely regulated the con-
duct of newsmen in the courtroom. For instance, the judge
504 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 57, NO. 2 (1978)
6. Sequestration of Jurors
Sequestration of the jury can also be utilized to avoid preju-
dice.2 7 5 In addition to its obvious benefit of insulating jurors from
publicity after they have been sworn, Chief Justice Burger has
stated that this alternative "enhances the likelihood of dissipating
the impact of pretrial publicity and emphasizes the elements of the
jurors' oaths. 27 6
7. Judicial Instructions
Instructions to the jury can also be an effective technique for
insuring impartiality.2 7 7 The American legal system demands a
great deal of jurors; great trust is placed in the ability of jurors
to disregard a myriad of factors that could influence their decisions.
Under the American system of the criminal jury trial, a juror tries
belatedly asked them not to handle and photograph trial ex-
hibits lying on the counsel table during recesses.
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358 (1966).
275. E.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. 'Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 564 (1976); id. at
601 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment); Sheppard v. Maxwell,
384 U.S. 363 (1966); Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 250 (1910).
See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 546 n.3 (1965) (It is interesting to
note that at the time of Estes seven states required that the jury
be sequestered during felony trials.); Stanga, Judicial Protection of
the Criminal Defendant Against Adverse Press Coverage, 13 WM. &
MARY"L. Rzv. 1, 23-29 (1971); Comment, Sequestration: A Possible
Solution to the Free Press-Fair Trial Dilemma, 23 AM. U. L. Rv.
923 (1974).
United States v. Holovachka, 314 F.2d 345, 352 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 374 U.S. 809 (1963) upheld the trial court's sequestration of
the jury over the objection of the defendant.
276. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 564 (1976). Of course
there are disadvantages associated with this alternative. It can be
costly. It works a hardship on jurors with a "consequent difficulty
in jury selection. [And], many defendants are wary of jury sequestra-
tion ... [arguing] that the jurors will resent it and hold a defendant
responsible . . . ." State v. Allen, 73 N.J. 132, -, 373 A.2d 377, 381(1977). These considerations, while relevant, must not be considered
in the abstract, but in light of the first amendment rights at stake.
The Allen court, while stating that sequestration can be a harsh alter-
native, notes that it will not be necessary in most trials and that
is should be given serious consideration in those few in which it is
necessary. Id. at -, 373 A.2d at 383.
277. E.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 564 (1976) ("the
use of emphatic and clear instructions on the sworn duty of each juror
to decide the issues only on evidence presented in open court"). See
also State v. Ell, 196 Neb. 800, 807, 246 N.W.2d 594, 599 (1976); A.
FRIENDLY & R. GOLDFi.RB, supra note 266, at 106-09; Schmidt, supra
note 241, at 450.
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questions of fact based solely upon the 'evidence presented at the
trial. The juror is typically instructed not to "consider any evi-
dence which has been stricken from the record," not to "be influ-
enced by statement of counsel not supported by evidence," and not
to consider his personal knowledge of "any material or particular
fact not supported by the evidence."
2 7 8
He is required to divorce pity, passion and prejudice from his mind.
He is forbidden to be governed by sentiment, conjecture, public
opinion or public feeling. If evidence is admitted and afterwards
ordered stricken out, he must disregard it. He cannot draw infer-
ences from rulings made by the trial judge on objections to the
admission of evidence.2 79
Jurors are even asked to disregard a defendant's "confession" as
evidence of guilt when that confession has been found inadmissible
as substantive evidence and has been admitted solely to determine
the credibility of the testifying defendant.
2 0
It is clear not only that a great deal is demanded of jurors, but
also that they perform as demanded. 28 ' Recent examples of situa-
tions involving massive pretrial publicity, Watergate and My-Lai,
demonstrate that jurors can and do reach impartial verdicts in such
cases. For example, a jury in New York acquitted former Attorney
General John Mitchell and forner Commerce Secretary Maurice
Stans.282 A jury in the District of Columbia acquitted former Gov-
ernor John Connally.28 3 A jury in the District of Columbid con-
victed Watergate burglar G. Gordon Liddy. The court of appeals
affirmed that conviction and the Supreme Court denied defendant's
petition for a writ of certiorari which argued in part that publicity
had made it impossible to select an impartial jury.28 4 A jury in
278. NEBRASKA JuRy INSTRUcTIONs, No. 1.01 (1969). Regarding statements
of counsel not supported by evidence, see State v. Reinert, 197 Neb.
379, 380, 248 N.W.2d 782 (1977).
279. Younger, Fair Trial, Free Press and the Man in the Middle, 56 A.B.A.
J. 127, 128 (1970).
280. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 223 (1971). But see Bruton v.
United States, 391 U.S. 123, 129 (1968) (admission of a confession by
petitioner's co-defendant, who did not take the stand and whose con-
fession implicated petitioner, held to violate petitioner's right to con-
front the witnesses against him even though jury was instructed not
to consider the confession as substantive evidence of petitioner's
guilt); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 382 n.10 (1964). See also Ore-
gon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
281. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 413-14 (1972); Johnson v. Louisiana,
406 U.S. 356, 361-62 (1972).
282. United States v. Mitchell, No. 73-439 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
283. United States v. Connally, No. 74-440 (D.D.C. Apr. 18, 1975).
284. Liddy v. United States, 420 U.S. 911 (1975).
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the District of Columbia convicted former White House aide Dwight
Chapin. The court of appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court
denied Mr. Chapin's petition for certiorari, which argued that pre-
trial publicity had made the selection of a fair jury impossible. 2 5
A court martial convicted Lieutenant William Calley for his role
in the so-called "My-Lai Massacre." A federal district court re-
versed the conviction on a finding that publicity had made it impos-
sible to obtain a fair jury panel. The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit reversed en banc and found that Lieu-
tenant Calley had received a fair trial.
280
The effectiveness of jury instruction has not gone unquestioned.
Mr. Justice Jackson, for example, has stated: "The naive assump-
tion that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the
jury ... all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction."28 7
The problem with such a statement is that it greatly understates
the usefulness of instructions. There is evidence that jury instruc-
tions can be effective, particularly when used in combination with
other protective techniques.
There is supportive empirical evidence, although the results of
such studies are somewhat inconsistent and the tests are unavoid-
ably flawed by inability to test real juries in real trials. Courts
which have addressed the question generally support this conclu-
sion. These cases and their principles cannot be used to sustain
convictions and then be ignored in regard to the first amendment
rights of the media. Experience in actual trial situations, with ac-
quittals in highly publicized trials, tends to affirm the conclusion.
In any event, it does not make sense to suddenly disregard this
long relied upon alternative and instead infringe first amendment
rights. Neither the time nor the circumstances are right for aban-
doning "our own longstanding perceptions about jury behavior." 28
8. Control Over Courtroom Personnel and Officers of the Court
Another alternative to the closed court is judicial control over
courtroom personnel and officers of the court. This alternative can
be less restrictive but it can also be equally restrictive and, in the
latter situation, an alternative, but an unacceptable one. In Shep-
285. Chapin v. United States, 515 F.2d 1274 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1015 (1975).
286. Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert. denied
sub nom. Calley v. Hoffman, 425 U.S. 911 (1976).
287. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S.. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
288. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 362 (1972). See also Lakeside v.
Oregon, 46 U.S.L.W. 4248, 4250 n.11 (U.S. Mar. 22, 1978).
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pard v. Maxwell,28 9 the Supreme Court indicated that in some cases
an exercise of control by the court over "the release of leads, infor-
mation and gossip to the press" 290 by employees and officers of the
court may be allowed and be effective in protecting the defendant's
right to a fair trial.
This "control" could be anything from educating those involved
in regard to the problems that can be created by what they say, to
judicial orders of silence. In the latter situation, of course, the Ne-
braska Press Association gag on the press has been replaced with
a gag on someone else. Such action threatens not only the rights
of the press, but also the first amendment rights of those gagged,
adding another layer of constitutional problems to this alternative
and making it one that the courts should turn to only most reluc-
tantly and most carefully, if ever.
Even the judicial gag order could run all the way from one di-
rected at the court's own employees, clerks, and secretaries, to one
directed at the defendant and his attorney. Such an order directed
against the defendant, in addition to not being responsive to any
request the defendant might have made, presents serious constitu-
tional problems regarding the defendant's own rights to free speech
and to due process of law.2 9 1
In an illustrative contemporary case in Hawaii, Mayor Frank
Fasi of Honolulu is simultaneously involved in a campaign for gov-
ernor and a trial for bribery. Mayor Fasi alleges that the bribery
trial is "a political Vendetta."292 He has accused the incumbent gov-
ernor, who narrowly defeated Mayor Fasi in the last gubernatorial
primary, of using the bribery charge in a last ditch attempt to keep
the governorship. To silence Mayor Fasi would strike at the heart
of the first amendment.
289. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
290. Id. at 359.
291. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 564-65 n.8 (1976)("We are not now confronted with such issues."); id. at 601 n.27(Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment); CBS, Inc. v. Young, 522
F.2d 234, 240 (6th Cir. 1975) (trial court's order that all parties, their
relatives, close friends and associates refrain from discussing the case
with the media or the public held to be a prior restraint and uncon-
stitutional). But compare In re Oliver, 452 F.2d 111 (7th Cir. 1971)(local rule barring extra-judicial comments by lawyers during pend-
ing cases held unconstitutional, but court indicated more narrowly
drawn rule could be constitutional) with Chicago Council of Lawyers
v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom. Cunning-
ham v. Chicago Council of Lawyers, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
292. Wall St. J., October 11, 1977, at 1, col. 4,
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Mayor Fasi has not been silenced. The Wall Street Journa2 93
reports that "just four days before jury selection began, Mr. Fasi
bought 37 minutes of television time to put on a program called
'My Side of the Story."' The prosecutor "declined to act on the
judge's suggestion that the state seek to block the Fasi TV program"
apparently because he agreed with the mayor that the latter's ac-
tions were protected by the first amendment. "I'm innocent until
proven guilty," said Mayor Fasi. "I have a constitutional right to
go before the public ....
What could the court do to someone like a Mayor Fasi, a candi-
date for a state's highest executive office, who is running against
the man who controls the state's prosecutorial arm? His opponent,
the incumbent governor, is prosecuting the mayor, alleging that the
latter has accepted bribes. The mayor, who was running a very
close race with the governor, counters that the charges are baseless
and have been trumped up by the incumbent to destroy the mayor's
campaign, so that the governor can maintain control of the state
house. Is it constitutional to gag the mayor or even his attorney?
If not, then, when the mayor buys large amounts of television time
to protest his innocence and challenge the integrity of his opponent,
is it constitutional to stop the incumbent from responding, directly
or through the prosecutor?
It is arguable that the rights of the candidate for public office
and of the public to know about their candidates shift the balance
in this situation. But is not the problem much the same outside
the electoral process? What about the businessman negotiating a
deal in competition with the president or governor's close friend?
It could be argued that in each of those cases the defendant has
not sought any restrictions and that even if the court has no power
to gag or close in those situations, it can when the defendant re-
quests that it do so. But what about the defendant candidate who
wants these things kept out of the papers? He wants the hearing
closed and the participants gagged. He knows who is going to obey
the order and who is not. He knows how to leak information to
the media and hide his own role in the leak and he wants his honest
opponent silenced. What does the court do in the face of the leaks
293. Id.
294. Id. at 36, col. 3-4. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S.
539, 606 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) ("even a
brief delay in reporting . . .shortly before an election may have a
decisive impact on the outcome of the democratic process"); Shuttles-
worth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 163 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
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and the defendant's (and the media's) protestations of innocence
regarding the leaks?
The point is that when courts get into the business of trying
to control what is seen and heard, the lines become more and more
difficult to draw. Even in a particular situation in which a closing
order might seem necessary, the court must consider the conse-
quences of opening the door to an ad hoc balancing of the free press
and fair trial rights in all cases in which such an order is sought.29 5
An additional problem with gagging the participants in the trial
involves enforcing such an order. Information will leak out and
will be reported. Generally the only way to discover the source
of the leak will be through the reporter, and the reporter may or
may not be willing or able to reveal his sources. This puts the
court in the situation of having to face multiple constitutional prob-
lems: those associated with the rights of the media, those associated
with the gag of the participants, and those associated with requiring
disclosure of reporters' sources. 2
96
9. Mistrials, New Trials, and Reversals
If the use of the other alternatives, alone or in combination,
proves unsuccessful, if it becomes apparent that a jury, impaneled
free from unconstitutional prejudice subsequently becomes preju-
diced prior to the close of the trial, the availability of a mistrial
allows the trial judge to avoid infringement of either first or sixth
amendment rights.297
Finally reversals and new trials, though hardly desirable, are
always possible if, after careful scrutiny of the complete record of
the proceedings and upon mature reflection, a court determines that
trial by an impartial jury was denied the accused.298
295. See Barnett, supra note 1, at 559.
296. Regarding the latter problem, see Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665
(1972). See generally Schmidt & Volner, Nebraska Press Association:
An Open or Shut Decision?, 29 STAN. L. REV. 529, 535 n.40 (1977)(experience of William Farr, then a reporter for the Los Angeles Her-
ald Examiner, who refused to reveal a source regarding a story on
the Charles Manson trial). See also note 342 and accompanying text
infra.
297. E.g., State v. Allen, 73 N.J. 132, -, 373 A.2d 377, 391 (1977) (Pashman,
J., concurring); Napoli v. Supreme Court, 40 App. Div. 2d 159, 338
N.Y.S.2d 721 (1972). See also United States v. Titsworth, 422 F. Supp.
587 (D. Neb. 1976) (discussed note 247 supra).
298. E.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 603 (1976) (Brennan,
J., concurring in the judgment) ("Finally, if the trial court fails ... to
utilize these [less restrictive alternatives] effectively, there are the
'palliatives' of reversals on appeal and directions for a new trial.");
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10. Other "Alternatives"
Two additional procedures have been mentioned which, while
they may not be "less restrictive alternatives," are worthy of some
mention. The first is the civil damage action against the press and
the second is the contempt power of the courts.29 9
United States District Court Judge Fred M. Winner has sug-
gested that
the publisher's judgment of what he wants to publish should be
exposed to monetary risk if he is guilty of an error in judgment.
If a man's Sixth Amendment rights are violated, why is that
not just as actionable as violations of his Fourth Amendment
rights?...
Let a jury decide upon proper instructions whether a newspaper
has violated a defendant's constitutional rights and whether that
newspaper should pay damages .... 30o
Some of the problems with that approach are demonstrated by
McNally v. Pulitzer Publishing Co. 30 1  Among other things, Mc-
Nally sued a reporter, his publisher and various prison officials for
damages for violation of his right to a fair trial. "Assuming, with-
out deciding, that a cause of action for damages [for violation of
the fair trial right] against private parties acting under color of
federal law may exist. . . [i] t is elementary that . . . the plaintiff
must demonstrate" 302 that the right was deprived. In McNally,
plaintiff's conviction had been upheld against his claim of violation
of his right to a fair trial and the result of that earlier appeal was
found to work an estoppel in this civil action.
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966); United States v. Tits-
worth, 422 F. Supp. 587 (D. Neb. 1976). See also, e.g., Estes v. Texas,
381 U.S. 532 (1965); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); Zediker
v. State, 114 Neb. 292, 301, 207 N.W. 168, 171 (1926) (reversed and
remanded for a new trial "with instructions to the district court to
grant application for a change of venue"); Olsen v. State, 114 Neb.
112, 116, 206 N.W. 1, 2 (1925) (reversed and remanded for a new
trial "with directions to grant a change of venue").
299. Winner, Free Press-Fair Trial: A Simplistic Approach, LITIGATION,
Summer 1976, at 5-6. See also Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427
U.S. 539, 588 n.15 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment);
id. at 594 n.20.
300. Winner, supra note 299, at 6. Judge Winner does recognize that alter-
natives such as "[c]hange of venue, full voir dire juror examination
and juror sequestration will suffice in almost all cases." Id.
Violation of fourth amendment -rights by federal officials was held
actionable in a private damage action in Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
301. 532 F.2d 69 (8th Cir. 1976).
302. Id. at 76.
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The immediate problem with the analogy between the civil ac-
tion for violation of fourth amendment rights and the violation of
sixth amendment rights, as suggested by McNally, is that even if
the analogy is valid, the fourth amendment right is a right against
federal officials, not private parties. As a general rule, it would
be difficult to find the media acting under color of law.303
An additional, and perhaps larger and ultimately more fatal
problem with the civil damage action is, as McNally indicates, that
the convicted defendant's proper remedy is appeal and, if his fair
trial right was denied, reversal. If the defendant has been con-
victed and the conviction upheld on appeal then the fair trial right
has not been denied. The remedy would only be available to those
who had been acquitted or to those whose convictions were re-
versed. It should prove difficult for those acquitted to prove that
their right to a fair trial was denied. This leaves the remedy avail-
able to those whose convictions have been reversed.3 04 Cases in
which publicity is a basis for reversal are so 'extremely rare as to
render this remedy virtually meaningless. In any event, in this
situation the aggrieved has another remedy, one which he has al-
ready taken advantage of, that is, reversal. It is doubtful that a
second remedy, civil damages, will accomplish enough to justify its
creation in this area of first amendment rights.3 0 5
In Nebraska Press Association, the Supreme Court left open the
question whether courts have the power to punish the media for
303. Any other kind of civil damage action "alternative" would have to
be legislatively created. Any such statute clearly would pose consti-
tutional problems of a nature which are outside the scope of this arti-
cle.
304. The unconstitutional conviction cannot be allowed to stand while it
is suggested as solace to the convicted that he sue those responsible
to compensate for the loss of freedom. This is, after all, not at all
similar to the unconstitutional search and seizure, another area in
which the civil damage action against the offending party has been
suggested. There the constitutional violation has aided the fact find-
ing process, and the evidence unconstitutionally seized will actually
assist in reaching a just and true result. The whole problem with
unconstitutionally prejudicial publicity is that its effect on the trier
of fact produces unjust, incorrect results.
305. Cf. Martin v. Merola, 522 F.2d 191, 194 (2d Cir. 1976) ("Until the
state prosecutions have been concluded, it is simply impossible to
make any reasoned evaluation of plaintiffs' claim that they have been
deprived of the opportunity to secure a fair trial by reason of the
defendants' actions.") In Martin the plaintiffs, under indictment on
felony charges, filed a damage action alleging, inter alia, denial of
their right to a fair trial by the prosecutors having announced to the
press the arrest of plaintiffs and having asserted that they were linked
directly to crime families.
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contempt for publications which endanger the criminal defendant's
sixth amendment right to a fair trial.30 6 It did, 'however, seem
to recognize that the jurisdictional problems inherent in this "alter-
native" make it unlikely to be effective in the very types of cases
where the sixth amendment right encounters real jeopardy--
the trial of more than local interest.30 7 The jurisdictional and the
practical difficulties of controlling "each newspaper, magazine, ra-
dio station and network, and each television station and network
. [are] self evident. '30 8
In any event, this is not the place for a complete discussion of
the contempt power, other than to note that
[a] ny attempt to control the press by means of the contempt
power will encounter serious first amendment objections. The
courts have long held that utilization of the contempt power isjustified only where the out-of-court speech or publication consti-
tutes a clear and present danger to the administration of justice. 309
The dangers created in this area are, by their very nature, suffi-
ciently speculative to make this test extremely difficult to apply
with any specificity.3 10 In addition, it is perhaps worthy of note
that not one of the attempts by various Supreme Court Justices
to delineate less restrictive alternatives for the protection of the
right to a fair trial has included contempt as an "alternative."
11. Less Restrictive Alternatives: Conclusion
The one situation in which these less restrictive alternatives
might not protect a defendant's fair trial right is the case in which
the publicity at the time of the crime is intense and nationwide,
the publicity will follow the defendant anywhere, the publicity will
not die down significantly, and in any event, would regenerate later
if the trial were postponed. In light of the fact that trials like
those of the Watergate defendants and Lieutenant Calley satis-
fied the constitutional fair trial requirements, this situation must
306. 427 U.S. at 557 n.5; id. at 594 n.20 (Brennan, J., concurring in the
judgment).
307. Id. at 565-66. Can the court in North Platte, Nebraska, get jurisdiction
over papers and television and radio stations and networks in other
counties or even other states? Can such an order ever be enforced
in the really newsworthy case?
308. Goodale, supra note 112, at 502.
309. Ranney, supra note 254, at 827-28 (footnote omitted). See also Mary-
land v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 921-36 (1950) (Frank-
furter, J., opinion respecting denial of certiorari) (summary of Brit-
ish contempt cases).
310. See §§ IV-B to C infra.
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be limited to the most extreme cases, that is, the assassination of
the President or other famous person. It is possible in that type of
case that there would not be any effective less restrictive alterna-
tive.311 However, in the case in which the publicity is that extreme
it is quite unlikely, first, that it is the open judicial proceeding which
would lead to violation of the defendant's right and, second, that the
closed court alternative itself would be effective. 12 In addition,
it is in this type of case, the case of assassination of high political
leaders, that the public's need to know is the greatest. The after-
math of the assassination of President Kennedy should serve as a
lesson demonstrating what would happen if the courts tried to con-
duct secret proceedings in these kinds of cases.
A situation in which consideration of these less restrictive alter-
natives may be particularly appropriate is the case in which a closed
court is requested in the pretrial stages. In this situation all of
these alternatives will be available to the court after the pretrial
proceeding has been conducted and the effect, if any, of the pub-
licity can be assessed. The court can hold the preliminary hearing
in open court and if that hearing turns out in fact to generate a
good deal of publicity adverse to the defendant, then the court can
change the venue, grant a continuance, or do what ever else is nec-
essary to protect the rights of the accused.3
13
Whether particularly appropriate or not, consideration and use
of these less restrictive alternatives is mandated by Nebraska Press
Association. Before a hearing or a trial in a criminal prosecution
could ever be closed, those who would close the proceeding must
demonstrate on the record that these alternative techniques will
not suffice to protect the rights of the accused. The United States
Supreme Court found nothing in Nebraska Press Association dem-
onstrating that these less restrictive alternatives would not fully
protect the rights of the defendant therein. The record in that case
included "the premeditated mass murder," in a town of about 850,
of six members of one family, ranging in ages from 66 to five, evi-
dence of sexual assault on children and an elderly woman, both
before and after death, a number of incriminating statements (if
not outright confessions) by the accused, and "intense . . . perva-
sive" and "widespread news coverage," locally, regionally and na-
tionally.31 4
311. But see notes 281-86 and accompanying text supra.
312. See § I1-B infra.
313. See, e.g., State ex rel. Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. Phillips, 46 Ohio
St. 2d 457, 461, 351 N.E.2d 127, 130-31 (1976).
314. 427 U.S. at 542, 562-63. See id. at 567-69, 573-75 (Brennan, J., con-
curring in the judgment); Oral Argument Transcript at 57-58, Ne-
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The single real criticism of the less restrictive alternative analy-
sis in this particular area of the law involves the results of empirical
studies on the effectiveness of these alternatives. The results of
the studies which have been done are to some extent inconsistent.
Most seem to find that initial prejudice can be overcome by factors
such as judicial instruction, the solemnity of the situation and the
sense of responsibility thereby created, juror commitment on voir
dire, and a continuance to allow time for the prejudice to dissi-
pate.3 15  However, some of the literature either discounts the
cleansing abilities of these alternatives or expresses doubts about
the reliability of the studies which indicate that the alternatives
are effective.310
Two points should be made in this regard. First, even those
who argue against the effectiveness of many of the alternatives dis-
cussed must admit their effectiveness in the vast majority of crimi-
nal trials. In the vast majority of criminal cases the effectiveness
of alternatives such as change of venue, voir dire, change of venire,
continuance, and sequestration when the publicity comes after the
empanelling of the jury cannot be doubted. Additionally, in many
cases alternatives which may be less effective when used singly may
become very effective when combined with others.
Second, the burden of proof is on those who argue that the rights
of the media should be infringed because under the circumstances
of the particular case, or even as a general proposition, the alterna-
tives will not be effective. Criticism of the Court's opinion in Ne-
braska Press Association for not relying on empirical data perhaps
misunderstands the point of the burden of proof. The lack of pre-
braska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Larson, Free Press
v. Fair Trial in Nebraska: A Position Paper, 55 NEB. L. REv. 543,
545-47 (1976). See also Joint Appendix filed in Nebraska Press Ass'n
v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
Judge Eric Younger has stated "that the factors present in the Si-
mants case [Nebraska Press Ass'n] make as good a case for [a re-
strictive] order as is ever likely to exist, with the possible exceptions
of Presidential assassinations." Younger, supra note 40, at 16.
315. See generally H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966);
Simon, supra note 241, at 528; Schmidt, supra note 241, at 443-52.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Nebraska Press Association
v. Stuart made no mention of the empirical studies discussed
above. Nevertheless, the opinion was consistent with the bulk
of the findings of those studies in coming down strongly on
the side of a free press. Experiments to date indicate that
for the most part juries are able and willing to put aside
extraneous information and base their decisions on the evi-
dence.
Id. at 443-52 (footnotes omitted).
316. E.g., Schmidt, supra note 241, at 443-52 (footnotes omitted).
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sentation of such data is not the fault of the court so much as the
litigant with the burden. If the data is not presented convincingly,
then a ruling against the party with the burden is demanded. These
alternatives are accepted as alternatives; they have a place in our
jurisprudence, and will maintain that place until those who would
infringe first amendment rights instead are able to demonstrate
that they can no longer be considered effective.
Granted, one might appreciate discussion by the highest court
of the land of relevant studies in a case of such major constitutional
proportions, whether brought up by counsel or not. If legislative
facts are to be judicially noticed, some "legislative history" would
be helpful.3 17 In Nebraska Press Association, Chief Justice Burger
stated: "Sequestration of jurors is, of course, always available. Al-
though that measure insulates jurors only after they are sworn,
it also enhances the likelihood of dissipating the impact of pretrial
publicity and emphasizes the elements of the jurors' oaths."318 Cer-
tainly one might wish he had explained how he knew, or whether
his judgment was intuitive. But in -the end, as Zachariah Chafee,
Jr., has stated: "What a majority of the Supreme Court votes, how-
ever, does have considerable bearing on truth in constitutional
law.,3 19
One of the great lessons of adjudication of fundamental constitu-
tional rights is that this lack of conclusiveness cannot be enough
to justify falling back on the infringement of a known and certain
right. The argument that results of studies in this area are incon-
clusive simply adds another layer of speculation to the question of
whether the defendant's rights will be infringed; the same kind of
speculation condemned in Nebraska Press Association.320
317. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 n.11 (1954).
318. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 564 (1976).
319. Chafee, Book Review, 62 HAnv. L. REv. 891, 895 (1949), reprinted in
SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSITUTiONAL LAw 618, 621 (Ass'n of Am. Law
Schools ed. 1963) (A. MEI KiJOmHN FREE SPEEcH (1948).
The justification came before the policy rather than vice versa.
The policy was not first decided upon and the alternatives then offered
as justification. It is clear that prior to the prejudicial publicity prob-
lem in criminal cases, most, if not all of these alternatives had been
used to counteract potential juror prejudice in other situations. The
natural, and the only justifiable, next step was to apply these same
alternatives in the prejudicial publicity cases.
320. 427 U.S. at 563; id. at 599, 604 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judg-
ment). See also, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Court refused
to allow states, in promotion of speculative rights of the fetus, to in-
fringe known and certain fundamental right of the woman). Entirely
consistent with this is Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690-91 (1972),
in which the Court found that the effect of the state action on the
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B. The Burden is on Those Who Would Close the Court to Prove
That Open Proceedings Would Result in Denial of Defendant's
Rights
The second element of the burden of proof on those who would
close the court in a criminal case is to establish a causal relationship
between the exercise of the right (the open court) and the substan-
tive evil the government has the right to regulate (the unfair trial).
Those who would close the court first must establish that without
such restrictions the defendant will be deprived of his right to an
impartial jury.321 Nebraska Press Association recognized "the prob-
lems inherent in . . . demonstrating, in advance of trial that ...
a fair trial will be denied." 22 This burden is so heavy in part be-
cause of the number of effective alternative ways of securing a fair
trial.3 " Additionally, in advance, of the proceeding the extent of
any publicity and its impact on the eventual jurors (particularly
in light of the less restrictive alternatives) is "of necessity specula-
tive, dealing ... with factors unknown and unknowable."3
2 4
In Nebraska Press Association, the Supreme Court held that the
trial court was correct in finding "intense and pervasive pretrial
publicity,"825 but constitutionally unable to make the further find-
ing that such publicity would fatally affect the upcoming trial be-
cause of what the Supreme Court characterized as unknowable fac-
tors. "A free press cannot be shackled by speculations as to inflam-
matory publicity."3 26 Speculation of a number of forms is inherent
in this situation.
The court considering the closing order must first speculate as
to whether there will be any prejudicial publicity emanating from
the judicial proceeding if it is left open. Most judicial proceedings
in criminal cases attract no attention or such little attention as to
be insignificant.3 27  Even in the case which seems more "news-
rights of the press was speculative and, therefore, the question was
resolved against the press.
321. E.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562, 569 (1976);
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 423 U.S. 1327, 1333 (1975) (Blackmun,
J., Circuit Justice). See also Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S.
539, 571 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
322. 427 U.S. at 569.
323. See § IV-A of text supra.
324. 427 U.S. at 563 (emphasis added). Accord, id. at 599 ("the harm
to a fair trial . . .must inherently remain speculative"); id. at 604
(Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment>.
325. Id. at 563.
326. United States v. General Motors Corp., 352 F. Supp. 1071, 1074 (E.D.
Mich. 1973).
327. See, e.g., note 329 infra.
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worthy," the court still must speculate as to the form of the pub-
licity, its context, its intensity, its frequency, its longevity, and in
short, all of those things which go to make up its impact.3 28
If the proceeding for which closing is considered is pretrial, the
speculative nature of the decision is geometrically increased. In
addition to other factors the court must speculate whether the de-
fendant will eventually go to trial, in the face of the fact that most
criminal matters do not go to trial.3 2 9 And, the court must specu-
late whether, if the defendant does go to trial, the publicity about
which it has already speculated will make it impossible to impanel
a fair and impartial jury..3 0  To some extent the court is called
328. Mr. Justice Brennan, concurring in the judgment in Nebraska Press
Ass'n, discussed this speculation by stating that the court
will be unable to predict the manner in which the potentially
prejudicial information would be published, the frequency
with which it would be repeated or the emphasis it would
be given, the context in which or purpose for which it would
be reported, the scope of the audience that would be exposed
to the information, or the impact, evaluated in terms of cur-
rent standards for assessing juror impartiality, the informa-
tion would have on that audience.
427 U.S. at 599-600 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (foot-
notes omitted). See also Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad,
420 U.S. 546, 559 (1975) ("It is always difficult to know in advance
what an individual will say, and the line between legitimate and il-
legitimate speech is often so finely drawn that the risks of freewheel-
ing censorship are formidable.").
329. E.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 600 (1976) (Brennan,
J., concurring in the judgment) ("[W]e can take judicial notice of
the fact that . . .few criminal cases proceed to trial, and the judge
would thus have to predict what the likelihood was that a jury would
even have to be impaneled.").
Even further, the court must speculate whether the trial will be
a jury trial. Restraint would not be appropriate if the case were tried
to the court. See L. TRmiE, supra note 16, § 12-11, at 625.
In 1964 Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach said
that twelve and a half percent of the cases involving Federal
defendants went to trial and only eight percent were tried
by juries. So we deal, at the outside, with eight percent of
the Federal cases.
Judge Skelly Wright, of the D.C. Court of Appeals, has
stated in discussing the issues of free press and free trial that
there is no problem at all in the great majority of the hun-
dreds of thousands of criminal cases which are brought each
year in this country because less than one percent of the cases
are ever given a line of notice in the press and of that one
percent seventy-five to ninety percent plead guilty. So, as
Judge Wright has pointed out, what is involved is a small
fraction of the less than one percent of the criminal cases
brought.
A. Cox, M. HOWE, & J.R. WiGGINs, CIVIL RiGHTs, THE CONSTITUTION,
AND THE COURTS, 56, 70-71 (1967).
330. The court must speculate about the scope of the audience to be reached
518 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 57, NO. 2 (1978)
upon to speculate that if the defendant goes to trial the facts being
kept from potential jurors, by keeping them from the press by clos-
ing the proceeding, will not be admitted eventually at the trial.38 1
The final element of speculation is that the court must speculate
that the closed proceeding will be effective; that the press will not,
on its own, at another time and place, uncover and then publish
the same information which is being kept from them by closing
the proceedings in the first place.332
It is based on this speculation and presumption, that courts are
asked to order the public, including the press, excluded from pre-
trial or trial proceedings. Not only is "[s]uch a speculative and
presumptive judgment . . an impossible one to make in most
cases," 33 3 but it is also an unconstitutional judgment. Clearly this
speculation cannot justify the infringement of first amendment
rights.3
34
by the publicity, and the impact on that audience. It must also specu-
late about the effectiveness of the less restrictive alternatives, all of
which will be available after the pretrial proceeding. See, e.g., notes
313-28 and accompanying text supra.
331. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 600 (1976) (Brennan,
J., concurring in the judgment). Mr. Justice Brennan footnotes that
"all of the material that was suppressed in this case was eventually
admitted at Simants' trial." Id. at 600 n.25.
332. See § IV-C infra.
333. State ex tel. Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. Phillips, 46 Ohio St. 2d 457,
469, 351 N.E.2d 127, 135 (1976).
334. A major point of Nebraska Press Ass'n was that in that case there
was no "conflict" between the first and the sixth (both through the
fourteenth) amendments. There is a right to a free press, and the
infringement of that right was clear; there is a right to an impartialjudicial proceeding, but there was no infringement (clear or other-
wise) of that right, or, at least, there was nothing in that record which
demonstrated such an infringement. There was only speculation
about publication compounded by speculation about the effect of
whatever publication might occur. See also Southeastern Promotions,
Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
note 16 supra.
The speculative nature of the decisions required in these situations
is underscored by the fact that the gag order which was the subject
of the appeal in Nebraska Press Ass'n had been passed on by three
Nebraska Courts, each of which reached a different conclusion. See
State v. Simants, 194 Neb. 783, 236 N.W.2d 794 (1975), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
Mr. Justice Blackman, in ruling on a stay application reached a fourth
conclusion in Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 423 U.S. 1327 (1975)(Blackmun, J., Circuit Justice), and the United States Supreme Court
reached a fifth when it unanimously declared each of the previous
four unconstitutional in Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539(1976).
In those criminal cases in which one could argue that some in-
RIGHTS OF THE PRESS
Those who would close the court seem to argue that their burden
of proof is met through the following assumption: either one who
is exposed to publicity regarding the case could never be an impar-
tial juror or it will be impossible to separate those who will not
be able to render an impartial verdict from those who will. Not
only are these assumptions factually unwarranted, they are consti-
tutionally prohibited. Constitutional fair trial standards do not de-
mand jurors unexposed to publicity concerning the trial.
It is not required, however, that the jurors be totally ignorant
of the facts and issues involved. . . . To hold that the mere ex-
istence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of
an accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of
a prospective juror's impartiality would be to establish an impos-
sible standard. 335
In Nebraska, assumptions disqualifying jurors who have been
impressed by publicity regarding the case are, if anything, even
more specifically prohibited. Nebraska has a statute of long stand-
ing which provides in relevant part:
The following shall be good causes for challenge to any person
called as a juror or alternate juror, on the trial of any indictment:
(2) that he has formed or expressed an opinion as to the guilt
or innocence of the accused; Provided, if a juror or alternate juror
shall state that he has formed or expressed an opinion as to the
guilt or innocence of the accused, the court shall thereupon proceed
to examine, on oath, such juror or alternate juror as to the ground
of such opinion; and if it shall appear to have been founded upon
fringment of the rights of the defendant is not speculative, e.g., Lee
Harvey Oswald and the assassination of President Kennedy, Jack
Ruby and the killing of Lee Harvey Oswald, the closed proceeding,
inevitably, will be of no help to that defendant. The publicity will
be there in any event. Although the closed court in civil proceedings
is outside the scope of this article, it is clear that the speculative nature
of the problem in the criminal cases may not necessarily carry over.
For example, in civil actions in which it is necessary to protect a
trade secret, courts have allowed the receipt of certain portions of
the evidence in camera. The damage to a trade secret in these cases
is not so speculative. "[I] t also would be folly to commence a suit
to protect a thing that will be lost by that suit." Curtis, Inc. v. Dis-
trict Court, 186 Colo. 226, 231, 526 P.2d 1335, 1337 (1974). Similarly,
there may be little speculation involved in regard to certain very lim-
ited situations in criminal cases. For example, in camera testimony
to prevent the revelation of the identity of an undercover agent. (This
does not mean that restrictions would always be justified in this situa-
tion; only that damage to a legitimate governmental interest may be
less speculative.).
335. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722-23 (1961). See also, e.g., Murphy
v. Florida, 421'U.S. 794, 799-800 (1975); Lutwak v. United States, 344
U.S. 604, 619 (1953); Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 248 (1910);
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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reading newspaper statements, communications, comments or re-
ports; or upon rumor or hearsay, and not upon conversations with
witnesses of the transactions or reading reports of their testimony
or hearing them testify, and the juror or alternate juror shall say
on oath that he feels able, notwithstanding such opinion, to render
an impartial verdict upon the law and the evidence, the court, if
satisfied that such juror or alternate juror is impartial and will
render such verdict, may, in its discretion, admit such juror or
alternate juror as competent to serve in such case .... 330
This statute has been interpreted in a line of cases going back al-
most 100 years to mean that a potential juror is not automatically
disqualified by exposure to newspaper publicity about the crime
being tried. Even his opinions as to guilt or innocence from reading
or hearing about the case do not automatically disqualify him.337
In Fisher v. State,33 8 for example, the defendant was convicted
of killing her son by whipping him to death with a ruler and a
stick. The case was publicized extensively in the North Platte area
before trial. One newspaper quoted the county attorney as saying
the coroner's jury found the boy's death "hastened by malnutrition"
and the result of a "most inhuman beating administered by his
mother."3 39 Yet the defendant failed to gain reversal:
The claim of error is predicated on an assumption that the jurors
read the matters published and were influenced, prejudiced, and
disqualified thereby. This assignment is wholly unsupported. Op-
portunity for prejudice or disqualification is not sufficient to raise
a presumption that they exist. 340
C. The Burden is on Those Who Would Close the Court to Prove that
The Closing Will Protect Defendant's Rights
The third part of the burden of proof on those who would close
the proceeding is the burden of establishing that doing so will effec-
tively secure the desired end, that is, trial by an impartial jury.3 41
336. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2006 (Reissue 1975) (emphasis partially added).
See also id. § 25-1636.
337. E.g., Fugate v. State, 169 Neb. 420, 99 N.W.2d 868 (1959); Sundahl
v. State, 154 Neb. 550, 48 N.W.2d 689 (1951); Kitts v. State, 153 Neb.
784, 46 N.W.2d 158 (1951); Ringer v. State, 114 Neb. 404, 410-11, 207
N.W. 928, 930-31 (1926); Rottman v. State, 63 Neb. 648, 650, 88 N.W.
857 (1902); Basye v. State, 45 Neb. 261, 277, 63 N.W. 811, 816 (1895);
Bohanan v. State, 18 Neb. 57, 24 N.W. 390 (1885); Curry v. State, 5
Neb. 412 (1877). See also State v. Bautista, 193 Neb. 476, 227 N.W.2d
835 (1975).
338. 154 Neb. 166, 47 N.W.2d 349 (1951).
339. Id. at 168, 47 N.W.2d at 352 (quoting North Platte daily paper).
340. Id. at 169, 47 N.W.2d at 352. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2006 (Reissue
1975).
341. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 565, 569 (1976); Nebraska
RIGHTS OF THE PRESS
Not only is closing the pretrial proceeding not the least restrictive
alternative and not only is it extremely difficult, if not impossible,
to show that defendant's rights will be denied if the proceeding
is not closed, but there is serious question as to whether closing
the proceeding is even an effective alternative. It is difficult to
prove that closing the proceeding will keep facts from the potential
jurors. In some cases it will be difficult to demonstrate that keep-
ing facts from the media will not work against the accused.
Closing a hearing would not restrict the press, in its various com-
ponent parts, from, for example, gathering news in other ways and
then publishing that news, publishing whatever information by
chance or by design leaks out however accurate or garbled the
leaked information may be,342 or even indulging in speculation or
publicizing gossip or rumors-gossip spawned in part perhaps by
the secrecy surrounding the closed proceeding, rumors which "could
well be more damaging than reasonably accurate news accounts."
343
The question of whether an order closing the court would serve
its intended purpose is a very real one.344 In any event, the burden
of demonstrating the efficiency of closing the court is on those who
would close it and, once again, speculation in that regard will not
be enough. Like the other parts of the burden, this part, if it can
be met at all, must be met factually on the record.
345
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 423 U.S. 1327, 1333 (1975) (Blackmun, J., Cir-
cuit Justice); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940). Mr.
Justice Powell concurring in Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S.
539, 571 (1976), states that it must be shown that the threat to the
right of the accused must be "posed by the actual publicity to be
restrained .... [A] restraint may not issue unless it also is shown
that previous publicity or publicity from unrestrained sources will
not render the restraint inefficacious." See also Oliver v. Postel, 30
N.Y.2d 171, 282 N.E.2d 306, 331 N.Y.S.2d 407 (1972).
342. To prevent this sort of thing, courts would be likely to more frequently
consider gagging the participants in the trial or hearing, the constitu-
tionality and efficiency of which is in doubt, see notes 290-95 and
accompanying text supra, and to enforce those gag orders ordering
revelation of sources when such an order appears to have been vio-
lated, opening yet a third constitutional can of worms. Note 296 supra.
343. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 567 (1976). See generally
id. at 599-600 n.22 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). "Se-
crecy, where events of public importance are involved, always sug-
gests suppression, and suppression in its own turn, generates rumors;
and rumors, which are planted in the soil of suspicion eventually send
forth the ugly plant of perverted truth." In re Mack, 386 Pa. 251,
277, 126 A.2d 679, 691-92 (1956) (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
344. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 569 (1976).
345. See note 234 and accompanying text supra. See also notes 325-34
and accompanying text supra.
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As stated above, but worth restating, the Supreme Court of the
United States has held that these same burdens of proof were not
met in Nebraska Press Association, a case in which the record in-
cluded: A town of about 850; "the premediated mass murder" of
six members of one family, ranging in age from 66 to five; evidence
of sexual assault on children and an elderly woman, both before
and after death; a number of incriminating statements (if not out-
right confessions) by the accused; and "widespread" intense and
pervasive local, regional, and national news coverage, including a
National Broadcasting Company helicopter which arrived in North
Platte, Nebraska, from Denver, Colorado, before the bodies had been
removed from their house.
3 46
V. CONCLUSION
For over 200 years the general rule has been that the courtrooms
of the United States have been open to the public and the media.
During this period trials generally have been fair and public, in
spite of the fact that many of the cases have been notorious, or
have involved bizarre facts.
For all of those years, the Constitution and common law of the
United States have guaranteed the openness of judicial proceedings,
federal and state. For over 200 years, means other than closing
pretrial proceedings in criminal cases have been available, and have
been utilized, to permit both the rights to freedom of the press and
to an impartial jury to flourish. Neither right has been used to
diminish the power and the majesty of the other. There is no rea-
son to now suggest that secret court proceedings, with all of the
severe social and political implications which they raise, are sud-
denly necessary to assure fair trials.
346. Note 314 and accompanying text supra.
